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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT DYNAMICS
Ryan Heath Peters
Lucian A. Taylor
This dissertation contains two paper. The first, “Volatility and Venture Capital,” demon-
strates that the performance of venture capital (VC) investments load positively on shocks
to aggregate return volatility. I document this novel source of risk at the asset-class, fund,
and portfolio-company levels. The positive relation between VC performance and volatility
is driven by the option-like structure of VC investments, especially by VCs’ contractual
option to reinvest. At the asset-class level, shocks to aggregate volatility explain a substan-
tial fraction of VC returns. At the fund level, consistent with the reinvestment channel,
this exposure is concentrated in years two through four of fund life and in early-stage VC
funds, which have more embedded reinvestment options. For VC-backed portfolio com-
panies, volatility shocks correlate with faster and more frequent reinvestment. The level
of volatility at the time of investment has no relation with future performance, consistent
with competitive markets. Overall, my results imply that the option-like features of VC
investments are first-order determinants of risk in VC.
The second paper, “Intangible Capital and the Investment-q Relation,” shows that the
neoclassical theory of investment, which has mainly been tested with physical investment,
also helps explain intangible investment. At the firm level, Tobin’s q explains physical and
intangible investment roughly equally well, and it explains total investment even better.
Compared with physical capital, intangible capital adjusts more slowly to changes in in-
vestment opportunities. The classic q theory performs better in firms and years with more
intangible capital: Total and even physical investment are better explained by Tobin’s q
and are less sensitive to cash flow. At the macro level, Tobin’s q explains intangible in-
v
vestment many times better than physical investment. We propose a simple, new Tobin’s q
proxy that accounts for intangible capital, and we show that it is a superior proxy for both
physical and intangible investment opportunities.
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CHAPTER 1 : Volatility and Venture Capital
1.1. Introduction
This paper identifies a novel source of risk that helps to explain the observed time-series
patterns in venture capital (VC) investment performance: exposure to shocks to the level
of aggregate idiosyncratic return volatility. While idiosyncratic shocks are by definition
mean-zero return shocks, the level of idiosyncratic volatility drives VC returns through
the value of the real options embedded in VC contracts. When volatility increases, these
real options become more valuable, improving VCs’ performance. This paper examines the
extent to which this exposure can explain observed patterns in VC investment performance
and dynamics and identifies the primary channel driving this empirical relationship.
Two common contractual channels of VC investments generate option-like characteristics.
The first is the liquidation preference given to investors, which entitles them to recuperate
at least their initial investment before other investors participate in proceeds from any
potential firm exit. These liquidation preferences imply a nonlinear payoff structure similar
to those in equity options. The second channel is the (real) reinvestment option embedded
in the contracts that VCs write with their portfolio companies, namely a right of first refusal
for participation in future financing rounds.1
There are a number of other reasons why idiosyncratic volatility might be especially im-
portant to the VC sector. First, VC returns are known to be highly skewed. Metrick and
Yasuda (2011), among others, show that a very large share of the total returns in VC come
from a small fraction of their investments. Additionally, the compensation structure of VC
general partners (GPs) themselves (eg. two and twenty) encourages the construction of
portfolios that have a high total return variance, and thus a high idiosyncratic volatility.
Moreover, VCs traditionally invest in the types of firms (small, high-tech) whose idiosyn-
cratic volatility is high and loads heavily on aggregate changes in idiosyncratic volatility.
1Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) demonstrate that these contractual features emerge from the con-
tracting environment with learning and moral hazard.
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While each of these characteristics of VC investments suggest that idiosyncratic volatility
may be particularly large, none of them suggest that changes in the level of idiosyncratic
volatility should drive returns.
I investigate the empirical relation between VC investments and innovations in aggregate
idiosyncratic volatility at three levels of aggregation. First, at the asset class level, I measure
the exposure of VC benchmark portfolios to changes is aggregate idiosyncratic volatility.
Second, I use detailed data on investor cash flows to investigate the time heterogeneous
exposure of individual VC funds to innovations in asset volatility during those funds’ lives.
The third level of aggregation is at the level of individual investments by VCs into their
portfolio companies, where I investigate the extent to which idiosyncratic volatility is related
to the process by which VCs invest.
Rather than directly constructing a measure of VC portfolio company idiosyncratic volatil-
ity, I use a measure of the idiosyncratic volatility of publicly traded equities from Herskovic,
Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) as a proxy for the idiosyncratic volatility of
VC-backed firms. I use a public market proxy for two reasons. First, return data on pub-
licly traded equity is of better quality and available at a much higher frequency, allowing
for high-frequency estimates of idiosyncratic volatility shocks. The second reason is that
using a measure from public markets minimizes potential endogeneity concerns.2
There are a number of reasons to believe that the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms
is strongly related to that from public markets. First, Herskovic et. al. (2016) show that
publicly traded firms’ idiosyncratic volatility obeys a strong factor structure, i.e. that the
level of idiosyncratic volatility is highly correlated across firm sizes and industries. Addi-
tionally, they find that the idiosyncratic volatility of small firms along with high-tech and
health-related firms, the types of firms typically financed by VC funds, are more sensitive to
this common factor. Finally, I validate the measure by comparing low frequency estimates
2One potential source of endogeneity is the fact that the amount of experimentation done by VCs, and
therefore the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms, may be endogenously determined by the amount
of capital available to VCs for investment as argued by Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013, 2016).
2
of VC-backed firm idiosyncratic volatility to similarly timed low frequency measures from
publicly traded firms and show that these two series move together strongly.
I begin the main empirical analysis by establishing that commonly used VC benchmark
return indexes load positively on idiosyncratic volatility shocks. In particular, factor re-
gressions for these VC indexes have significantly higher R2 when including idiosyncratic
volatility shocks. In other words, idiosyncratic volatility shocks explain a large fraction of
the variance of VC industry returns after accounting for the fraction explained by market
returns. I incorporate lagged regressors in these factor regressions to account for asyn-
chronous prices of privately traded firms as discussed in Dimson (1979), and find that a one
quarterly standard deviation innovation to the level of idiosyncratic volatility corresponds
to an approximately 8% return in the VC index. This effect is even larger for a benchmark
index of early-focused VC performance.
If the price of volatility risk is non-zero, this exposure has implications for the risk-adjusted
performance of VC investments. There is a large body of theoretical and empirical work3
that suggests the price of volatility exposure is negative, i.e. that investors are willing to
pay for exposure to this risk. In this case, the positive exposure to this risk documented
in this paper implies that the risk-adjusted performance of VC investments is higher than
previously believed. I test this hypothesis by measuring the exposure of VC benchmark re-
turn indexes to a tradeable portfolio of equity options constructed to proxy for idiosyncratic
volatility risk, and find that accounting for this tradeable factor increases the risk-adjusted
performance of venture capital investments by as much as 6% per year.
Next, in order to relate these shocks to investor cash flows directly and investigate the
potential channels driving this empirical relationship, I examine the exposure of individual
venture capital funds to changes in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. I use the realized cash
flows between investors and the VC funds in which they invest from Burgiss. This data is
3See Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwer-
burgh (2016).
3
sourced from a diverse array of limited partners (fund investors) for whom Burgiss provides
investment decision support tools and includes a complete transaction and valuation history
between the LPs and fund investments.
The fund performance measure I use is the public market equivalent (PME) of Kaplan
and Schoar (2005), which accounts for the opportunity cost of capital.4 I find a significant
relation between fund PME and idiosyncratic volatility shocks over the life of the fund and,
in particular, those shocks that occur in years two and three of the fund’s life. This finding is
consistent with the reinvestment option channel, since by year two most initial investments
will have been made, and by year 5 VC fund managers are looking to exit their positions.
I also estimate the strength of this exposure in funds with different investment focus. The
relation is much stronger for those funds which focus on early-stage investments, where
reinvestment options inherently plays a larger role, than in late-stage investment focused
funds. In a placebo analysis, I show that buyout funds, which buy target companies whole
and therefore have no reinvestment options, exhibit no exposure to volatility shocks. This
suggests that exposure to aggregate idiosyncratic volatility is not a feature of private equity
investments more broadly.
At the level of VC investments into portfolio companies, I use cash-on-cash multiples and
annualized returns as the measures of performance, controlling throughout for public equity
prices (Tobin’s q) and returns. I find that investments made when idiosyncratic volatility
is high do not have higher average returns than those made at other times, consistent
with the level of idiosyncratic volatility being priced into individual VC financing deals,
as would be expected. What does drive investment-level returns are shocks to the level of
idiosyncratic volatility after the initial investment. This relationship is again much stronger
for early investment rounds, consistent with the reinvestment channel. I also find that
reinvestments happen faster and are more likely in times of rising idiosyncratic volatility,
4Specifically, the PME provides a valid economic performance measure when the LP has log-utility
preferences and the return on the LP’s total wealth equals the market portfolio (Sorensen and Jagannathan,
2015). I also examine the effect of loosening these restrictions, as in, for example, Korteweg and Nagel
(2016).
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suggesting that these innovations have a direct relationship with the amount of capital
available to entrepreneurs.
Taken together, these results imply a strong effect of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility shocks
on investment returns and dynamics in VC investments. This effect can help us to under-
stand the time-series of VC investment dynamics and rationalize the large differences in
risk-adjusted returns observed at different times in the existing literature. Moreover, the
results imply that the real options embedded in VC investments are a first-order determi-
nant of risk in VC.
This paper relates to the literature surrounding the impact of contractual and informa-
tional frictions on VC investments. In particular, Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013)
demonstrate how the principal-agent problem between VCs and their investors cause private
equity fund returns to depend on diversifiable risk in the cross section of funds. This effect
is distinct from the time-series relationship investigated in this paper. In addition, their
cross-sectional results hold for both VC and buyout funds, while the results in this paper
hold only for VC funds. This result makes sense because the reinvestment options which
are the focus of this paper are only present in VC investments. Cornelli and Yosha (2003)
show that staged financing helps to mitigate the problem of manipulation for purposes of
window-dressing. Fluck, Garrison, and Myers (2007) highlight the role of staged financing
as a real option and show that it alleviates the effort provision problem.
There is also a substantial literature on the risk and return characteristics of VC investments:
Cochrane (2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Hall and Woodward (2007), Korteweg and
Sorensen (2010), and Korteweg and Nagel (2016). A large literature on the implications
of idiosyncratic risk for entrepreneurs and managers is summarized by Heaton and Lucas
(2004) and Hall and Woodward (2010). This paper differs from the previous literature by
explicitly accounting for the role of idiosyncratic volatility in return dynamics.
This paper also relates to a large empirical literature on the role of idiosyncratic return
5
volatility. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) examine secular variation in average
idiosyncratic return volatility. Wei and Zhang (2006) study aggregate time-series variation
in fundamental volatility. Engle and Figlewski (2015) document a common factor in option-
implied volatilities. Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) study measures of uncertainty from
aggregate and firm-level data and relates them to macroeconomic activity. Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006) show that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn abnormally
low average returns. This paper adds to this literature by identifying VC as a sector that
is particularly exposed to idiosyncratic volatility risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 presents two potential channels of
volatility exposure. Section 1.3 introduces the VC data and the idiosyncratic volatility mea-
sure and compares public and private market idiosyncratic volatility. Section 1.4.1 presents
empirical results using VC-industry return indexes. Section 1.4.2 presents empirical results
using investor cash flows while section 1.4.3 presents empirical results using investment-level
data. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2. Sources of Volatility Exposure
This section briefly describes two potential channels through with VC investments may be
exposed to shocks to the volatility of their underlying assets. The first channel is through
the liquidation preference given to investors through the convertible preferred equity struc-
ture common to VC investments. This contractual feature of VC contracts induces both
concavity and convexity in the VC payoff, which can lead to volatility exposure. The second
channel is the (real) reinvestment option embedded in the contracts that VCs write with
their portfolio companies. These contracts frequently include a contractual right of par-
ticipation in future investment rounds which can again lead to a volatility exposure of the
vale of the security. Both liquidation preferences and staged investment emerge from the
contracting environment with information asymmetry (Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005)),
an inherent friction in the financing of small, private firms. A third potential explanation
of the idiosyncratic volatility exposure of VC is that the underlying assets, the portfolio
6
companies themselves, are positively exposed to volatility shocks.
1.2.1. Liquidation Preferences
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) report that of 213 rounds of financing, all but one contained
some form of liquidation preference. A standard specification of the liquidation preference
takes the following form in the National Venture Capital Association’s (NVCA) 2013 model
term sheet:
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Company, the
proceeds shall be paid as follows: First pay [x] times the Original Purchase
Price ... on each share of Series A Preferred. Thereafter, the Series A Preferred
participates with the Common Stock pro rata on an as-converted basis.
Typically, the liquidation preference amounted to the lesser of the liquidation value of the
firm and the VC’s original investment (x = 1) and may include an unpaid cumulative
dividend (45% of cases) that raises this amount over time.
Figure 1: Convertible Preferred Equity
Panel (a) shows the intrinsic and total value of convertible preferred equity stake. The solid
line is that payoff that the holder of the the convertible preferred equity receives at a given
exit value. The dashed (blue) and dotted (red) lines are the value of holding the convertible
preferred equity as calculated using the Black-Scholes model. The dashed blue and dotted
red lines assumes an annualized volatility of 0.3 and 1.0, respectively. For both lines the
interest rate and dividend yields are zero and the time to expiration is three years. Panel
(b) shows the vega, or volatility exposure, of the convertible preferred equity as calculated
in Eq. 1.1 for the same parameter values.
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Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows a payoff diagram for a typical convertible preferred equity
stake.5 The dashed line represents the payoff to a participating convertible preferred equity
investor holding a certain ownership share in the firm (in this case 30%). The dashed (blue)
line represents the value before the final payoff is realized, as calculated using the Black-
Scholes model assuming an annualized volatility of 30% while the dotted (red) line assumes
an annualized volatility of 100%, which is close to the average idiosyncratic volatility of VC-
backed firms (see Section 1.3.5).6 The distance between the dotted and solid lines represents
the extrinsic value of the option and is directly related to the volatility of the underlying
asset. The volatility exposure, or vega, of a long call option is positive and easily calculated
as:
∂C
∂σ
= S
√
T
2pi
e−(log(S/X)+(r+σ
2/2)T)
2
/(2σ2T ), (1.1)
where T is the time until option expiration, r is the interest rate, X is the strike price, σ
is the underlying volatility and S is the value of the firm. Panel (b) shows the vega of the
convertible preferred equity position.
Figure 1 shows that when the volatility is relatively low the direction of the volatility
exposure is ambiguous. However, when the volatility is high enough, and in particular is
the level observed for VC-backed firms, the negative volatility exposure of the concave part
of the payoff is potentially larger than that from the convex part. This implies that this
particular contractual feature of VC investments is unlikely to drive the positive volatility
exposure of VC returns.
1.2.2. A Simple Model of Idiosyncratic Volatility and Reinvestment
An alternative potential driver of volatility exposure of VC investments lies in the (real)
reinvestment option, or the contractual right of participation in future investment rounds.
5A number of theoretical papers rationalize this form of equity participation by investors, eg. Cornelli and
Yosha (2003), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin
and Rochet (2007)
6For purposes of this figure the option is assumed to be three years from expiration, the assumed dividend
yield and interest rate are zero.
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The contractual right of first refusal on future investment rounds takes the following form
in the NVCA’s 2013 model term sheet:
“All Major Investors shall have a pro rata right, based on their percentage equity
ownership in the Company (...), to participate in subsequent issuances of equity
securities of the Company (...). In addition, should any Major Investor choose
not to purchase its full pro rata share, the remaining Major Investors shall have
the right to purchase the remaining pro rata shares.”
I present a simple 3-period investment model with a risk-neutral, competitive investor and
a penniless entrepreneur. The timing is as follows. In period 1, the entrepreneur decides
whether to invest $1 in the project. If he invests he receives a share α1 of the project and
receives a publicly observed signal (λ) about the project payoff. In period 2 he can either
invest an amount F or not. If he decides not to invest the project dies (default) and he
receives a payoff of zero. If he invests he receives a share α2 of the project which dilutes his
original stake. In period three the project payoff (S) is realized.
In the simplest construction of this model, the signal λ is discrete and all information is
public. The payoff is S ∈ {SL, SH} where SL = µ − σ and SH = µ + σ with equal
probabilities. The public signal λ is informative about the type of the project:
P [λ = L|S = SL] = P [λ = H|S = SH ] = γ
9
The high payoff is more likely with a high signal:
P [S = µ+ σ|λ = H] = γ
where, without loss of generality, γ ∈ (0.5, 1] and a higher γ is associated with a more
informative signal. Then the expected payoff is
E[S|λ = H] = γ(µ+ σ) + (1− γ)(µ− σ) = µ− σ + 2γσ
E[S|λ = L] = (1− γ)(µ+ σ) + γ(µ− σ) = µ+ σ − 2γσ
Solving the model by backward induction, the share that leaves the competitive investor
indifferent in the second period, if λ = H, is
αH2 =
F
µ− σ + 2γσ
and when λ = L:
αL2 =
F
µ+ σ − 2γσ
Of course, investment is only feasible in the case that α2 ∈ [0, 1]. Investment in the second
round, given a bad signal (λ = L), will only occur if F < µ− σ(2γ − 1) = F¯ .
In period one, the investor invests one dollar for a share α1, knowing this share will be
diluted if he invests in the next round, in which case his final ownership share will be
(α2 + (1− α2)α1). The share α1 solves, in the case F > F¯
1 = 0.5((1− α2)α1)(µ− σ + 2γσ)
⇒ α1 = 2
µ+ σ(2γ − 1)− F .
The share of the projects required as compensation for the initial investment (α1) is de-
creasing in σ as long as 2γ − 1 > 0, which is true by assumption.
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In the alternative case F < F¯ , the share α1 solves
1 = 0.5((1− αH2 )α1)(µ− σ + 2γσ) + 0.5((1− αL2 )α1)(µ+ σ − 2γσ)
⇒ α1 = 1
µ− F .
Figure 2: Comparative Statics
This figure presents comparative statics for the model presented in Section 1.2.2. Panel (a)
shows the shares that the investors receive for their investment as a function of the risk of
the underlying cash flow while panel (b) shows the implied valuations that these shares
represent.
(a) (b)
Figure 2 shows comparative statics for this simple model. Panel (a) shows the shares
acquired in each period and state as a function of the risk (σ) of the underlying asset.
Panel (b) shows the post-money valuation in each state as a function of the risk. It is easy
to see that as long as reinvestment depends on the realization of the signal the value of the
firm is increasing in the risk of the underlying asset.
Model Takeaways
The model formalizes the intuition that the real option to reinvest or abandon is valuable
and that its value rises with the volatility of the underlying asset. Since the investor is
perfectly competitive, the entrepreneur retains all of the surplus generated by the project,
though in the real world one may expect either private information or other form of market
power on the part of the investor to cause a more even split in surplus. Regardless, once
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the initial investment is made, any increase in the volatility of the asset σ will lead to an
increased valuation for the investor.
Specifically, this simple model makes the time-series prediction that reinvestment options
lead innovations to the level of asset volatility, after the initial investment and before the
final investment, to increase investment performance. This prediction is distinct from that
of, for example, Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) who investigate the implications of
a principal-agent problem between investors and private equity firms. This friction drives a
cross-sectional relationship between diversifiable risk and fund performance. These authors
find that this relationship holds for both VC and buyout funds, as predicted by their model.
Reinvestment options, in contrast, imply a time-series relationship only for VC firms, who
retain reinvestment options, and not for buyout funds, who purchase going concerns.
1.3. Data Sources and Methodology
This section describes the data sources used in this paper. I use data on VC returns
and investments at three levels of aggregation. First, I describe VC return indexes from
Cambridge Associates (CA) and Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE), meant to proxy for the
returns to investing in VC in aggregate. Second, I describe the private equity fund cash flow
data from Burgiss. These are the realized cash flows experienced by investors into private
equity funds. Third, I describe the investment-level data from the VentureSource database.
These data describe the individual investments made by VC firms into their individual
portfolio companies and the outcomes of these investments. I also describe construction of
the measure of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility used throughout the paper and a measure
of the level of idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed portfolio companies.
1.3.1. Venture Capital Indexes
I use data on aggregate returns in the VC industry from Cambridge Associates and Sand Hill
Econometrics. Cambridge Associates (CA) provides a quarterly net-of-fees VC returns series
derived from disclosures by VC firm general partners. CA does not disclose what fraction
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of the universe of possible investments their data cover. One potential concern with the
CA VC return index is that it is subject to asynchronous prices resulting from the fact that
VCs infrequently update (mark to market) the value of their portfolio holdings. This is due
to the fact that fair (market) value of privately held companies is only observed when a new
transaction for shares in the portfolio company takes place, at which point the valuation
of previously held shares is adjusted.7 Those portfolio companies that do not experience a
valuation event are left at the previous “stale” valuation. This reporting convention causes
net asset values, and therefore the returns reported by Cambridge Associates, to appear
smoother and less correlated with market returns than are the unobservable true returns.
This asynchronous trading problem has been studied by, for example, Lo and MacKinlay
(1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994). Risk factors in the presence of
asynchronous prices can be recovered by projecting returns on contemporaneous and lagged
factor returns and summing the estimated coefficients (Dimson 1979). Woodward (2009)
contains a detailed example of this mechanism at work in VC data and estimates risk
loadings in the CA VC indexes. Section 1.4.1 describes the quantitative effect of this
correction. Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) propose an alternative correction which I discuss
in Section 1.3.5.
I use five different return indexes provided by Cambridge Associates. The first is meant to
proxy for returns in the VC industry as a whole. Three other indexes are meant to proxy
for returns of VC funds with different investment strategies: early-, multi- and late-focused
VC funds. The final index proxies for the returns to buyout funds.
Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) provides a monthly gross-of-fees return series derived from
the individual VC investments (VentureSource, discussed below) rather than the net asset
values reported by VC funds. SHE makes an effort to remove any bias introduced by
asynchronous prices by interpolating values between rounds, using market indications of
change in values. Details on SHE index construction are in Blosser and Woodward (2014).
7In the VentureSource data, described below, the median (mean) time between consecutive financing
rounds is 16 (21) months.
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1.3.2. Venture Capital Fund Cash Flow Data
VC fund performance data are from Burgiss, a global provider of investment decision sup-
port tools for the private capital market, and are described in detail by Harris, Jenkinson
and Kaplan (2014). The Burgiss dataset contains the complete transactional history for
over 6,800 private capital funds with a total capitalization representing over $4.7 trillion in
committed capital across the full spectrum of private capital strategies. Kaplan and Lerner
(2016) report that the Burgiss dataset is the likely the best available dataset of its type,
with a non-selected sample and very high coverage. The Burgiss dataset is representative
of actual investor experience, as the data are sourced exclusively from limited partners,
avoiding any reporting biases introduced by sourcing data from general partner surveys. I
focus my analysis on a sample of 914 VC funds first raised before 2011. Of these funds,
513 are designated as early stage funds, 118 as late stage funds and the remaining 283 are
designated as balanced funds. Cash flows include draw-downs, flows from investors to VC
funds, as well as distributions, flows from funds back to investors.
The Public Market Equivalent
The public market equivalent (“PME”), introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), is a
measure that evaluates fund performance based on cash flows. As discussed in Sorensen
and Jagannathan (2015), which this discussion largely follows, the PME provides a valid
economic performance measure when the investor (the limited partner or “LP”) has log-
utility preferences and the return on the LPs total wealth equals the market return. When
these conditions hold, the PME is a valid performance measure regardless of the risk of
PE investments, and it is robust to variations in the timing and systematic risks of the
underlying cash flows along with potential GP manipulations.
The PME calculation works as follows: Let X(t) denote the cash flow from the fund to the
LP at time t. This cash-flow stream is divided into its positive and negative parts, called
distributions, dist(t), and capital capital draw-downs, draw(t). A distribution is a cash flow
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that is returned to the LP from the PE fund (net of fees) after the fund successfully sells
a company. Capital draw-downs are the investments by the LP into the fund, including
management fees. Distributions and draw-downs are then discounted using the realized
market returns over the same time periods, and the PME is the ratio of the two resulting
valuations:
PME =
∑
t
dist(t)
1+rM (t)∑
t
draw(t)
1+rM (t)
.
The sum runs over the life of the fund and rM (t) is the realized market return. A PME
greater than one suggests that the value of the distributions exceeds the cost of the capital
calls, meaning the LP has benefited from the investment relative to the performance of the
market.
1.3.3. Portfolio Company Data
Venture capital-backed company data are from the VentureSource database, maintained
by Dow Jones. The full dataset contains 102,255 financing events for 30,689 companies,
including seed, early, mezzanine and late round investments by VC firms, acquisitions by
other companies and initial public offering (IPO) events. Most VC financings are syndicated,
ie. involve more than one VC firm financing the company.
To calculate company-level investment returns requires data on exit valuation (either IPO
or acquisition price) as well as the investment amount and fraction acquired for all rounds
between the initial round and exit. Following the literature on investment-level VC returns,
(e.g., Cochrane (2005), Korteweg and Sorensen (2010)), I calculate the gross multiple Mi,t
as:
Mi,t =
Vi
V Posti,t
T∏
s=t+1
Di,s,
where T is the total number of dilutive financing rounds, Vi is the exit valuation, V
Post
i,t is
the post-money valuation for the round, and Di,s is the dilutive factor for each round, which
is calculated as 1−Ki,s/V Posti,s , where Ki,s is the total capital raised in financing round s.
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As noted by Ewens, Rhodes-Kropf and Strebulaev (2016), investments that eventually have
an initial public offering have a relatively higher probability of their valuation being re-
ported. In contrast, acquisitions are much less likely to have prices and returns reported.
As IPO returns tend to exceed those of acquisitions, this leads to positive selection in any
VC returns data. Conversely, acquisition returns are underrepresented in the sample of
observed returns. I address this concern by following the Korteweg and Sorensen (2010)
approach of re-weighting the observed returns using the true exit weights in the full sample.
1.3.4. Public Market Idiosyncratic Volatility
One potential concern with using idiosyncratic volatility to explain VC investment returns
and investment dynamics is the fact that the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms
may be endogenously determined by the amount of VC investment through, for example,
an experimentation channel as argued by Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013, 2016). For this
reason, I construct a measure from public market return data. Data on public equity market
returns is from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) as reported by Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS).
I construct a monthly measure of average idiosyncratic volatility that follows the measure
documented in Herskovic et. al. (2016). The Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) is
constructed using data from the daily CRSP stock file for the years 1975-2014. Idiosyncratic
returns are constructed within each calendar month τ by estimating a factor model using
all observations within the month and takes the form:
rit = γ
iFt + ε
i
t
where t denotes a daily observation in month τ . Idiosyncratic volatility for each firm is
calculated as the variance of the residuals εit within each month. The return factor model
is purely statistical and specifies Ft as a constant and the first five principal components
of the cross section of returns within the month. CIV is calculated as the equally-weighted
16
average idiosyncratic volatility across firms.
I deviate from Herskovic et. al (2016) by measuring idiosyncratic volatility shocks as sta-
tistical innovations from the following ARMA(1,1) model on the level of CIV
σ2t = c+ ε
CIV
t + ϕσ
2
t−1 + θε
CIV
t−1 ,
whereas Herskovic et. al. (2016) construct CIV shocks as first-differences in the level of
CIV, assuming a unit root. I estimate that the autoregressive coefficient ϕ is 0.936 and
statistically different from unity (t = 3.85) and the moving average coefficient θ is -0.090
(t = −2.81).
When regressions are at the quarterly or annual level, CIV shocks are measured as the
average of the monthly CIV shocks over the quarter or year. Figure 3 shows quarterly CIV
over time along with the VIX, a measure of systematic volatility. The correlation between
the two series is 0.49 while the correlation between CIV shocks and similarly constructed
VIX shocks is significantly lower (0.1).
1.3.5. Measuring Private Company Idiosyncratic Volatility
In order to validate the public market proxy (CIV) for the volatility of VC-backed firms,
I compare low frequency estimates of the level of idiosyncratic volatility in these firms to
similarly timed low frequency estimates from public markets. This section follows directly
from Korteweg and Sorensen (2010); see their paper for details. These authors develop a
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation technique to estimate the risk and return
characteristics of VC-backed company equity, incorporating a selection model to account
for the fact that equity prices are observed infrequently and endogenously. This dynamic
selection problem arises because valuations of these companies are observed only in the
event that the company receives additional financing, either through a VC round or an
initial public offering (IPO). They find that accounting for dynamic selection dramatically
affects estimates of the market model parameters.
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Figure 3: Observed CIV and VIX.
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CIV is calculated as the equally-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility across firms from
a five principal components market model. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index, a measure
of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. VIX is calculated by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE).
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Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) address dynamic selection by simultaneously estimating the
following two-equation model:
v(t) = v(t− 1) + r + δ + β(rm(t)− r) + ε(t) (1.2)
w(t) = Z ′(t)γ0 + v(t)γv + η(t) (1.3)
where, in equation 1.2, v(t) is the log valuation at time t, r is the risk-free rate, rm(t) is the
market return and β is the factor loading on the market portfolio. They define
δ = a− 1
2
σ2 +
1
2
β(1− β)σ2m (1.4)
where σ and σ2m are the variance of the asset and market return, respectively, and a is the
excess return of the asset. It is easy to see that a simple rearranging of equation 1.2 delivers
something similar to the usual capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Valuations are only observed when a company has an event and equation 1.3 captures
this selection process. Valuation is only observed when the latent selection variable w(t)
is greater than zero. The vector Z(t) contains characteristics that affect refinancing and
exit events and the error term η(t) is normalized to have variance of one. The estimation
technique uses a Bayesian Gibbs sampling procedure to estimate the parameters of the
model δ, β, σ2, γ0 and γv.
I use this method to estimate the level of idiosyncratic volatility (σ) in VC portfolio com-
panies over time. Figure 4 shows these estimates along with 4-year averages of CIV. The
horizontal axis represents the cohort being studied, with some overlap to smooth out the es-
timates. For example, the 1996Q2 cohort was first financed between January and September
1996. I estimate the idiosyncratic volatility of these firms until exit. The solid line repre-
sents the annualized idiosyncratic volatility of this cohort and the dashed lines represent
the Bayesian confidence interval. Since the median VC-backed firm exits in about 4 years,
I compare these estimates with average CIV over 4 years starting in the same quarter. The
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Figure 4: Low-frequency Volatility Estimates
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This figure plots low-frequency estimates of idiosyncratic volatility measured in public (dot-
ted black line) and private markets (solid blue line). Bayesian 95% posterior confidence
intervals are denoted by dashed black lines. The estimates of public market idiosyncratic
volatility are 4-year averages, staring at the date represented on the horizontal axis, of
CIV as measured in public equity markets. The measure of private market idiosyncratic
volatility is estimated on cohorts of portfolio companies using the Bayesian MCMC method
of Korteweg and Sorensen (2010). A cohort is all VC-backed firms first financed in the
three quarters around the date represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis is the
annualized standard deviation of idiosyncratic volatility.
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correlation between the two measures is 0.81, implying a substantial amount of common-
ality in the movement in idiosyncratic volatility between public and private markets. This
result builds confidence in using a volatility measure derived from public equity markets.
1.4. Empirical Results
1.4.1. VC Industry Risk Exposures
I begin the empirical analysis by establishing that VC return indexes from two commonly
used sources load on idiosyncratic volatility shocks. The first source is Cambridge Associates
(CA) who report a number of net-of-fees VC indexes meant to benchmark for the VC
industry as a whole as well as those VCs with specific investment focuses. CA also reports
a benchmark index for buyout funds. The second source is Sand Hill Econometrics who
report a gross-of-fees VC return index meant to proxy for the returns VC firms themselves
earn from their portfolio companies. I then discuss the implications for expected returns of
VC investments if the price of volatility risk is non-zero.
Net-of-fees VC Index from Cambridge Associates
Regression results using the net-of-fees VC return indexes from Cambridge Associates are
presented in Table 1. To see the effect of asynchronous prices empirically, consider the na¨ıve
CAPM regression in column (1):
rCAt = α+ βM (r
m
t − rft ) + εt.
We can see that the CAPM results imply that the market beta of VC is a small 0.47 and
that the VC industry delivers a quarterly alpha of 2.58 percentage points. The problem with
this result, as discussed in Section 1.3.1, is that the returns to VC as reported by CA are
related both to contemporaneous and lagged market returns because of return smoothing
and asynchronous prices. These features of VC portfolios lead to large serial correlation in
the VC returns reported by CA.
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Table 1: CIV Exposure of VC Industry Returns
Statistics are based on quarterly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported by Cam-
bridge Associates (CA), on contemporaneous and lagged excess market returns and CIV shocks:
rCAt − rft = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − rft−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt.
Excess returns of the VC indexes and the market are expressed in percentage points. The CIV shocks
have been normalized to have a quarterly standard deviation of one. The row labeled
∑
β reports
the sum of the market factor loadings and the row labeled
∑
δ reports the sum of the CIV shock
loadings. The row labeled F reports the p-value from a two-sided F-test for which the null hypoth-
esis is that the sum of the coefficients on the CIV shocks are zero. In the first four columns the
VC index used is for all VC funds. In columns (5), (6) and (7) the index is constructed using ven-
ture capital funds that CA reports as having an early, balanced and late investment focus, respec-
tively. Column (8) reports an index constructed from buyout funds. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CA CA CA CA Early Balanced Late BO
rmt 0.468*** 0.465*** 0.507*** 0.518*** 0.546*** 0.466*** 0.411*** 0.375***
(0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.108) (0.073) (0.071) (0.037)
rmt−1 0.131 0.148 0.193** 0.249** 0.108 0.159** 0.107***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.111) (0.075) (0.074) (0.039)
rmt−2 0.223** 0.240** 0.310*** 0.381*** 0.186** 0.167** 0.080**
(0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.111) (0.075) (0.073) (0.038)
rmt−3 0.214** 0.306*** 0.343*** 0.233*** 0.271*** 0.086**
(0.091) (0.096) (0.109) (0.074) (0.073) (0.038)
rmt−4 0.193** 0.285*** 0.329*** 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.087**
(0.091) (0.096) (0.110) (0.074) (0.073) (0.039)
rmt−5 0.090 0.173* 0.202* 0.153** 0.057 0.062
(0.091) (0.097) (0.110) (0.075) (0.073) (0.039)
εCIVt 0.510 0.830 -0.077 0.128 -0.566*
(0.834) (0.954) (0.646) (0.622) (0.316)
εCIVt−1 0.504 0.784 -0.071 0.425 -0.363
(0.836) (0.956) (0.647) (0.621) (0.318)
εCIVt−2 1.884** 2.518*** 0.654 0.884 -0.251
(0.834) (0.954) (0.646) (0.613) (0.314)
εCIVt−3 1.410* 1.673* 0.754 1.590** 0.162
(0.832) (0.951) (0.644) (0.616) (0.315)
εCIVt−4 2.504*** 2.997*** 1.656** 1.080* 0.265
(0.830) (0.949) (0.642) (0.616) (0.318)
εCIVt−5 0.945 0.975 0.776 0.705 0.284
(0.805) (0.921) (0.623) (0.592) (0.302)
Constant 2.579*** 1.899** 0.644 -0.182 -0.372 -0.027 0.660 1.851***
(0.821) (0.853) (0.914) (0.928) (1.061) (0.718) (0.709) (0.370)∑
β 0.468 0.819 1.391 1.786 2.050 1.350 1.262 0.796∑
δ 7.757 9.776 3.691 4.813 -0.468
F 0.0003 0.0001 0.0242 0.0026 0.5606
R2 0.156 0.204 0.279 0.383 0.378 0.396 0.378 0.631
N 136 134 131 123 123 123 119 107
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We can address asynchronous prices by including lagged market returns in the regression
as suggested by Dimson (1979):
rCAt = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − rft−τ ) + εt.
For example, columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 report regression results including additional
lags of the market return. The sum of the coefficient estimates is reported in the row labeled∑
β. Here we can see that the lagged market returns enter with positive and statistically
significant coefficients, indicating that VC industry returns depend on contemporaneous and
lagged market returns because of asynchronous prices. The sum of the betas, representing
the true market exposure, is 1.39 and the risk-adjusted alpha is close to zero, once we
account for asynchronous prices. The largest and most statistically significant lagged return
coefficients are those on the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter lagged market returns.
To study the impact of idiosyncratic volatility shocks on VC returns, I additionally include
contemporaneous and lagged CIV shocks to the regression:
rCAt − rft = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − rft−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt. (1.5)
These shocks have been normalized to have a quarterly standard deviation of one. Column
(4) of Table 1 reports results from this regression. The sum of the coefficient estimates on
the CIV shocks is reported in the row labeled
∑
δ. We can see that past innovations in
idiosyncratic volatility have a significant effect on VC returns as reported by CA. The sum
of the coefficients on the idiosyncratic volatility shock in column (4) is 7.757, implying that
a positive one-standard deviation shock to the level of idiosyncratic volatility corresponds
to approximately an 8 percentage point return to VC investors. The row labeled “F” is the
p-value from an F-test whose null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients on the CIV
shock is zero, which we can easily reject at conventional levels. It is also interesting to note
that the lagged CIV shocks with the largest and most statistically significant coefficients
are those on the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter lagged shocks, similar to the lagged market return
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coefficients. The increase in the R2 between columns (3) and (4) is 0.104, implying that CIV
shocks explain a substantial portion of the return variance not explained by the market.
Note that, once I include the idiosyncratic volatility shocks in the return regressions, the
regression intercept can no longer be interpreted as a return, since the CIV shocks are
statistical innovations and not tradeable portfolios. See Section 1.4.1 below for a discussion
of the implications for risk-adjusted expected returns.
The remaining columns in Table 1 report results for other return indexes reported by Cam-
bridge Associates. Columns (5), (6) and (7) report results for indexes constructed from
early-, balanced- and late-focused funds, respectively. While all three VC strategy indexes
load significantly on the CIV shocks, the loading for the early-focused fund index is much
larger than that for the balanced- or late-focused fund indexes (9.78 versus 3.69 and 4.81,
respectively). Early-focused VC funds also have a larger loading on the market return than
late-focused funds. The final column in Table 1 reports results from the same regression
where the dependent variable is now the benchmark return for leveraged buyout funds. In
contrast to the results for VC indexes, the buyout index does not load significantly on CIV
shocks.
To confirm that it is truly idiosyncratic volatility, rather than systematic volatility, driving
the results I run untabulated regressions including contemporaneous and lagged measures
of both CIV shocks and VIX shocks, where VIX shocks are measured as ARMA(1,1) inno-
vations to the level of VIX. Shocks to the level of systematic volatility enter the regression
insignificantly whether or not the regression includes CIV shocks. In contrast, shocks to
CIV enter strongly significantly whether or not VIX shocks are included in the regressions.
Gross-of-fees VC Index from SHE
I also investigate the idiosyncratic volatility exposure of the VC return index from Sand Hill
Econometrics (SHE). SHE provides a monthly, gross-of-fees VC return index that has been
constructed to account for asynchronous prices as discussed in Blosser and Woodward (2014)
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and Woodward and Hall (2004). This series is constructed to measure the monthly return of
a value-weighted portfolio of VC-backed companies, while the CA indexes discussed above
are meant to represent averages of returns to investments in venture capital funds.
Factor regression results for this index are presented in Table 2. To establish a baseline
for this index, column (1) shows the results for the Fama French 3-factor model. The SHE
index has a large loading on the market return and a negative loading on the HML portfolio.
While the contemporaneous CIV shock doesn’t enter significantly (column (2)), lagged CIV
shocks do seem to be significantly related to VC returns as measured by this index (Columns
(3) and (4)). While only a few of the lagged CIV shocks are significant individually, their
sum is large and highly significant. The summed value of the lags is 1.69, implying that
a one standard deviation monthly CIV shock is associated with a 1.69% return. The row
labeled “F” is again the p-value from an F-test whose null hypothesis is that the sum of
the lagged CIV coefficients is zero.
The fact that the lagged exposure of the SHE index to CIV shocks is positive indicates
that the SHE procedure does not purge VC investment returns of their lagged exposure to
idiosyncratic volatility.
Implications for Expected Returns
The implications of volatility exposure for risk-adjusted VC returns depend on the price of
idiosyncratic volatility risk. Herskovic et. al. (2016) present evidence showing that the level
of idiosyncratic volatility proxies for idiosyncratic income risk faced by households and thus
argue that the price of volatility risk is negative, i.e. that investors are willing to accept
lower returns for assets have positive return exposure to aggregate idiosyncratic volatility.
This is because such an exposure would hedge their own exposure to idiosyncratic income
risk. In this case the inclusion of this priced risk will increase the risk-adjusted expected
returns of VC investments.
To test this hypothesis, I run a regression like that in Eq. (1.5) but using a tradeable
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Table 2: VC Industry Returns - Sand Hill Econometrics
Statistics are based on monthly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported
by Sand Hill Econometrics, on contemporaneous and lagged excess market and factor returns and
contemporaneous and lagged CIV shocks:
rSHEt = α+ βM (r
m
t − rft ) + βSrst + βHrht +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt
Excess returns of the VC index, market and return factors are expressed in percentage points. The
risk factors are the SMB and HML factors of Fama and French (1992). The CIV shocks have been
normalized to have a monthly standard deviation of one. The row labeled F reports the p-value
from a two-sided F-test for which the null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients on the CIV
shocks are zero.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mkt-RF 1.564*** 1.566*** 1.577*** 1.579***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
SMB 0.038 0.040 0.047 0.057
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
HML -0.664*** -0.661*** -0.625*** -0.627***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
εCIVt 0.043 0.050
(0.150) (0.154)
εCIVt−1 0.365** 0.378**
(0.147) (0.149)
εCIVt−2 -0.137 -0.143
(0.145) (0.149)
εCIVt−3 0.232 0.239
(0.151) (0.155)
εCIVt−4 0.312**
(0.150)
εCIVt−5 0.185
(0.148)
εCIVt−6 0.157
(0.150)
εCIVt−7 0.120
(0.149)
εCIVt−8 0.122
(0.149)
εCIVt−9 0.016
(0.152)
εCIVt−10 -0.029
(0.148)
εCIVt−11 0.287*
(0.148)
Constant 0.779*** 0.777*** 0.750*** 0.717***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.162) (0.162)∑
δ 0.46 1.69
F 0.074 0.002
r2 0.892 0.892 0.896 0.900
N 274 274 274 274
26
portfolio that is exposed to the level of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. I construct such
a portfolio by taking an equally weighted position in 91-day straddle positions in S&P 500
constituents on the last trading day of each quarter. The construction of the option straddle
portfolio is detailed in the appendix. This option portfolio delivers a mean return of -2.46%
per quarter with a standard deviation of 21% for an annualized Sharpe ratio of -0.23. The
average risk-adjusted return and Sharpe ratio are virtually unchanged in a Carhart (1997)
four-factor model. Regression results are in Table 3. Since option prices on individual stocks
are only available beginning in 1996, there are many fewer observations.
I start by re-running the analysis of Table 1 column (3) in column (1) of Table 3 to give a
baseline for the estimates of market slope and intercept, which are both somewhat higher in
this time period, relative to the estimates from the longer time period in Table 1. Column
(2) adds the contemporaneous and lagged returns on the option straddle portfolio. The
sum of coefficient estimates is a very statistically significant 0.70. Since the explanatory
variables are all market returns, the intercept of the regression can be interpreted as a risk-
adjusted excess return. Including the option straddle portfolio increases the intercept to a
marginally significant 2.52% per quarter, which corresponds to an annualized increase of
about 6% per year. In unreported regressions, I find that if CIV shocks are included in the
regression along with returns on the option straddle portfolio, the loadings on the option
portfolio returns become insignificant while the loadings on the CIV shocks remain quite
significant. This suggests that whatever explanatory power the option portfolio has is fully
subsumed by the actual idiosyncratic volatility shocks.
Columns (3)-(5) repeat the analysis for early-, balanced- and late-focused VC funds respec-
tively. The patterns are similar to those in Table 1 in that the coefficient estimates on the
idiosyncratic volatility proxy are largest for the early-focused VC fund benchmark. Column
(6) repeats the analysis for the buyout fund benchmark, which does not load significantly
on the option portfolio return.
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Table 3: Option Portfolio Exposure of VC Industry Returns
Statistics are based on quarterly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported by Cam-
bridge Associates (CA), on contemporaneous and lagged excess market returns and straddle option portfolio
returns:
rCAt − rft = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − rft−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτr
opt
t−τ + εt.
Excess returns of the VC indexes and the market are expressed in percentage points. The straddle option
portfolio is constructed by taking an equally weighted straddle (long call and long put) position in each
of the S&P 500 constituents. The row labeled
∑
β reports the sum of the market factor loadings and the
row labeled
∑
δ reports the loading on the straddle option portfolio return. The row labeled F reports
the p-value from a two-sided F-test for which the null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients on the
straddle option portfolio return are zero. In the first two columns the VC index used is for all VC funds.
In columns (3), (4) and (5) the index is constructed using venture capital funds that CA reports as having
an early, balanced and late investment focus, respectively. Column (6) reports an index constructed from
buyout funds. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA CA Early Balanced Late BO
rmt 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.46***
(0.154) (0.145) (0.163) (0.114) (0.097) (0.042)
rmt−1 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17* 0.15***
(0.152) (0.143) (0.160) (0.112) (0.096) (0.041)
rmt−2 0.26* 0.26* 0.31* 0.19* 0.12 0.10**
(0.152) (0.144) (0.161) (0.113) (0.096) (0.041)
rmt−3 0.26* 0.26* 0.28* 0.23** 0.27*** 0.09**
(0.152) (0.145) (0.162) (0.113) (0.097) (0.041)
rmt−4 0.24 0.25* 0.30* 0.18 0.07 0.04
(0.152) (0.146) (0.163) (0.114) (0.098) (0.042)
rmt−5 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.02
(0.153) (0.146) (0.163) (0.114) (0.098) (0.042)
roptt 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.03
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−1 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.04 -0.02
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−2 0.11 0.15* 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.071) (0.080) (0.056) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−3 0.19** 0.23*** 0.10* 0.07 -0.00
(0.071) (0.080) (0.056) (0.048) (0.020)
roptt−4 0.13* 0.15* 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−5 0.13* 0.16** 0.08 0.03 -0.03
(0.068) (0.077) (0.054) (0.046) (0.020)
Constant 0.88 2.52* 3.09* 1.06 1.94* 1.63***
(1.544) (1.495) (1.675) (1.172) (1.001) (0.429)∑
β 1.675 1.634 1.822 1.364 1.155 0.867∑
δ 0.697 0.880 0.340 0.316 -0.058
F 0.0003 0.0001 0.0191 0.0111 0.2686
R2 0.313 0.464 0.478 0.442 0.468 0.744
N 70 70 70 70 70 70
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1.4.2. Investment Sample Results
To understand the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on individual VC investments, I next use
the cash flows from individual VC funds. VC fund cash flow data has two large advantages
over the industry indexes studied above. First, the funds are investment vehicles and the
reported cash flows are the actual cash flows that investors receive. Given the illiquid nature
of private equity funds, it is important to take the timing of cash flows into account. The
second large benefit of using individual fund cash flows is that it allows an investigation
into when, during a funds life, asset volatility shocks matter the most. This will in turn
allow a better understanding of the mechanism driving this unique risk exposure.
I begin by regressing the PME on the average level and innovations to idiosyncratic volatility.
The basic empirical specification is as follows:
PMEi = α+ βCIVi + i (1.6)
where PMEi is calculated from quarterly fund cash flows and CIVi is a measure of the
level of or innovation in CIV scaled by the cross sectional standard deviation. Results are
in Table 4. Panel A reports results for regressions of PME on the average level of CIV
over the fund life, from the month the fund was founded through the last cash flow has
been distributed, an average of ten years. In the first column, labeled “VC”, the sample is
VC funds covered by Burgiss. The positive and statistically significant coefficient implies
that funds earn higher returns relative to public market equity when the level of CIV is
higher over the life of the fund. The coefficient of 0.204 implies that funds that experience
lifetime idiosyncratic volatility one standard deviation above (the cross-sectional) average
outperform public markets by over 20% more than average over the course of the fund’s
life.
The other columns of panel A investigate the same regression in subsamples. VC funds in
Burgiss are designated as early-, late- or balanced-focus funds, depending on what stage
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Table 4: Investment Outcomes
Statistics are based on OLS regressions of the Public Market Equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
on CIV levels and shocks:
PMEi = α+ βCIVi + εi.
The variable PME is calculated by discounting the actual cash outflows and cash inflows that the fund
received with the returns on publicly traded equity over the same time period and forming the ratio of the
discounted cash inflows over the discounted outflows. Fund cash flow data are from Burgiss. The sample for
the column labeled “VC” is all VC firms. The sample for columns “Early”, “Balance” and “Late” are VC
funds noted as having early, balanced and late stage focus, respectively. The sample for the column labeled
“Buyout” is all buyout funds. Panel A reports coefficients for regressions of PME on the average level of
CIV over the fund life. The independent variable in Panel B is the average CIV shock over the fund life and
in Panel C is the average CIV shock calculated between months 12 and 48 of the fund life. Standard errors,
in parentheses, are clustered by VC firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Panel A: Regressions on Average CIV
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
average CIV 0.204∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.124∗ 0.037 0.029
(0.057) (0.084) (0.049) (0.132) (0.027)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.013 0.017 0.01 0.001 0.003
Panel B: Regression on average CIV Shock
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
ε¯CIV 0.176∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.051 0.021
(0.045) (0.065) (0.042) (0.122) (0.025)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.001
Panel C: Regression on early CIV Shock
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
ε¯CIV 0.394∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.101 -0.004
(0.061) (0.097) (0.075) (0.110) (0.018)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.044 0.056 0.045 0.007 0.000
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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their portfolio companies are in when the funds first invest. We should expect idiosyncratic
volatility exposure to be largest for those VC funds that invest in early-stage investments,
since these funds are more likely to have reinvestment opportunities. The other columns
in panel A show that this is indeed the case: the coefficient on average CIV for early stage
funds is larger and more significant than for the other fund types. Late stage funds have
an insignificant loading on average CIV, as do buyout funds.
Panels B and C of Table 4 show results for regressions of PME on average CIV shocks. CIV
shocks are calculated as documented in section 1.3.4. In panel B, CIV shocks are averaged
over the life of the fund. Results using CIV shocks averaged over the fund life are similar to
those using level, which is reasonable considering the level reflects accumulated shocks. In
particular, the pattern of early stage-focused VC fund performance being more exposed to
idiosyncratic volatility remains. In unreported regressions, I include the initial level of CIV
at fund initiation. This additional explanatory variable enters insignificantly, implying that
any information about future expected volatility contained in the level is fully incorporated
into the price of fund investments.
Private equity funds usually last for about 10 years. Therefore the idiosyncratic volatility
shocks that I have investigated so far are averaged over those very long time periods. Panel
C of Table 4 investigates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility shocks averaged over the
12th through 48th month of the fund’s life, the time when reinvestments are most likely
to happen. The coefficient estimates and R2 are significantly higher when we focus on
this period of the fund life. Focusing on the full VC sample (column 1), I find that funds
that experience idiosyncratic volatility one standard deviation above (the cross-sectional)
average in years two through four of fund life outperform public markets by almost 40%
more that average over the course of the fund’s life. This rises to 53% when we consider
the subsample of early-focused funds. This is equivalent to an annual return of 4.3% over a
ten year fund. The R2 for this sample implies that the time-series of CIV shocks explains
over 5% of the cross-sectional variance of early-focused VC funds.
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For a more granular look, I next regress VC fund performance on multiple CIV shocks,
one for each of the first seven years the fund was in operation. To build these shocks,
I average the monthly CIV shock across each fund year. For example, if a fund was first
raised in June 1995, the first CIV shock is measured as the average monthly CIV shock from
July 1995 through June 1996, the second is from July 1996 through June 1997, etc. The
explanatory variables are again scaled so that one is equivalent to a single cross-sectional
standard deviation. Results are in Figure 5 which shows coefficient estimates and 95%
confidence bounds on these estimates. We can see that the impact of CIV shocks starts
positive and marginally statistically significant, is highest and highly significant in years 3
and 4 of the funds life, and falls close to zero by year 6. Together these results suggest that
CIV shocks help explain VC fund performance and that this effect is stronger during the
period when VC funds are likely to have already made investments and to be exercising
reinvestment options.
I next ask what the implication of these fund-level regression results is for the time-series of
VC fund performance. Using the same Burgiss dataset that underlies this section, Harris,
Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) find that “Average VC fund returns in the United States [...]
outperformed public equities in the 1990s but have underperformed public equities in the
most recent decade.” Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) document a similar pattern in the
returns of VC-backed companies. Accounting for ex-post realized shocks to the aggregate
level of idiosyncratic volatility can help to explain these patterns.
Figure 6 shows mean and median fund performance, as measured by PME, along with the
predicted performance given realized CIV shocks. The dashed (red) line is the mean fund
performance and the dotted (blue) line is the median fund performance for funds within
each vintage cohort. The mean is generally higher than the median due to the skewed
performance of VC funds. Vintage year is defined by the date of the first fund cash flow.
These realized performance measures, solid black line, are matched with fitted performance
measures from regression Equation 1.6 where the measure of CIV used is average over the
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Figure 5: Coefficients of regression of PME on averages of CIV shocks.
Figure reports coefficient estimates and confidence bounds from the following regression:
PMEi = α+
6∑
τ=0
βCIVi,t+τ + i
where PMEi is the public market equivalent of firm i as measured using the method of
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) from fund cash flows and CIVi,t+τ is the average (over monthly
observations) CIV shock in year t+ τ where year t is the year of fund formation. Standard
errors are clustered by venture capital firm and robust to heteroscedasticity.
33
Figure 6: Average and predicted performance of VC funds by vintage.
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are defined by the date of the first fund cash flow. Performance is measured as the public
market equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) from Burgiss fund cash flows. The
dashed (red) line is the mean PME of funds first raised in each vintage year. The dotted
(blue) line is the median PME. The solid line is the (ex-post) predicted average performance
of VC funds in each year conditional on future realizations of CIV shocks.
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12th through 48th month as in Panel C of Table 4. The fitted performance demonstrates
that, given the ex-post realized CIV shocks, the difference in relative performance over time
is not as large as previously believed.
Alternative β benchmarks
One potential concern with the PME measures introduced in section 1.3.2 and used in
section 1.4.2 is that the relevant benchmark for VC funds may not be a market index with
a β of unity. To address this concern, I repeat the analysis or section 1.4.2 using market
benchmarks with different levels of market exposure. Results are in Table 5 and indicate
that the broader pattern remains no matter what β benchmark is used.
1.4.3. Portfolio Company Sample Results
The final data set I investigate is Dow Jones VentureSource, discussed in Section 1.3.2. I
focus on a sample of 111,766 investments by 1,615 VC firms into 19,638 individual port-
folio companies made between 1990 and 2011. There are 47,411 financing events, most of
which involve more than one investor. I require a VC firm to participate in at least ten
financing rounds to enter the sample. I match these financing events with public market
condition. Public market data are from the web page of Kenneth French and CRSP. Cor-
porate accounting data are from Compustat. To measure average market prices of public
firms I calculate an average measure of Tobin’s q that incorporates intangible assets in the
denominator from Peters and Taylor (2016). Market returns (rmt,t+1) are value weighted and
measured over the following year and are calculated using the CRSP universe. Summary
Statistics are presented in Table 6.
The variables IPO and DEF are indicators for whether the company has had a successful
IPO or default respectively. A company is identified as having defaulted if it is listed as
out of business, in bankruptcy, or has been otherwise identified by VentureSource as not
active. A company is also labeled as having defaulted if it received the first VC funding
prior to 2004, has yet to exit by the end of the sample, and has never had a successful
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Table 5: PME Exposures for Different β Benchmarks
Statistics are based on OLS regressions of the Public Market Equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
on CIV shocks. The variable PME is calculated by discounting the actual cash outflows and cash inflows
that the fund received with the returns on publicly traded equity over the same time period and forming the
ratio of the discounted cash inflows over the discounted outflows. Fund cash flow data are from Burgiss. CIV
shocks are calculates as the 12-month average of monthly CIV shocks measured relative to fund founding.
For example, if a fund is established in July of year t, εCIVt,t+1 is the average of the monthly CIV shocks from
that July through the following June. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by VC firm and are
robust to heteroscedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PME(1.0) PME(1.5) PME(2.0) PME(2.5) PME(3.0)
εCIVt,t+1 0.223
∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
εCIVt+1,t+2 0.101 0.093 0.090 0.092 0.104
(0.075) (0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068)
εCIVt+2,t+3 0.304
∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.058)
εCIVt+3,t+4 0.345
∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059)
εCIVt+4,t+5 0.159
∗ 0.122 0.092 0.067 0.045
(0.070) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.063)
εCIVt+5,t+6 0.012 -0.044 -0.091 -0.139 -0.193
∗
(0.089) (0.079) (0.074) (0.074) (0.079)
εCIVt+6,t+7 0.026 -0.009 -0.038 -0.067 -0.098
(0.083) (0.074) (0.070) (0.069) (0.075)
Constant 1.208 1.056 0.965 0.926 0.940
(0.074) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061) (0.066)
R2 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.077 0.079
Observations 834 834 834 834 834
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Table 6: Summary Statistics: Individual VC Investments
Statistics are based on the VentureSource dataset. The sample covers venture capital investments bade
between 1990 and 2011. IPO and DEF are indicator variables for whether the company has a successful IPO
or observed default, respectively. CIVt is the CIV at the round close date. ε
CIV
t,t is the CIV shock over the
next year. CIV levels and shocks have been normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one.
Indus Q is the average Tobin’s q in publicly traded hi-tech firms at the round close date. rmt,t+1 is the market
return over the following year. Supply is the dollars invested in VC funds during the quarter as reported by
the NVCA. lage is the log age at first financing. syndsize is the size of the investing syndicate. lraised is the
log dollars raised by the company in its first round. cali and mass are indicator variables indicating whether
the company is based in CA or MA. Multiple is the cash multiple of money earned by a hypothetical dollar
invested in the financing accounting for any future dilution (zero for failed firms). Ann Ret is the multiple
divided by the time between the first rounds and exit, unavailable for failed firms. If the time between the
round and exit is less than one, the cash multiple is used.
variable mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N
IPO 0.155 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 111766
DEF 0.289 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
early 0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
CIVt 0.000 1.000 -1.487 -0.978 0.069 0.853 2.985 111766
εCIVt,t+1 0.000 1.000 -2.136 -0.828 0.038 0.497 3.200 111766
induq 2.072 0.924 0.702 1.465 1.842 2.437 5.242 111766
rmt,t+1 0.010 0.196 -0.568 -0.138 0.063 0.141 0.439 111766
supply 9.895 0.926 7.602 9.354 10.129 10.345 11.527 111766
lage 6.821 1.309 0.000 6.358 7.074 7.617 10.494 111766
syndsize 3.706 2.355 1.000 2.000 3.000 5.000 20.000 111766
lraised 2.001 1.216 -4.605 1.281 2.079 2.826 7.313 107632
cali 0.454 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
mass 0.129 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 111766
Multiple 3.825 7.514 0.000 0.000 1.438 3.870 48.736 20780
Ann Ret 1.258 3.305 -1.000 0.066 0.443 1.308 47.736 14669
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exit event. I designate a round as an early stage investment if VentureSource identifies the
round as being either a seed, angel or first round and a late stage round otherwise, 29.2%
of the sample. The variable ‘supply” is the quarterly flow of capital into the VC sector as
reported by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). In all regressions in this
section, CIVt and Qt are measured at the date of financing, ε
CIV
t,t+1 is the sum of monthly
CIV shocks over the year following the first financing and rmt,t+1 is the market return over
this same period.
I begin my analysis of company-level data with a consistency check: do firms funded in
times of high idiosyncratic volatility experience more extreme investment outcomes? To
investigate this question I identify extreme outcomes as a firm having either an observed
default or an IPO. Table 7 regresses these firm outcomes on various firm characteristics and
aggregate conditions. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is an indicator for firm
default, and coefficient estimates are expressed in percentage points. Column (1) regresses
this variable on the level of CIV at the first financing round, the Industry Q of small,
high-tech firms in the quarter of financing, and innovations to both the level of CIV and
market price. The coefficient estimates indicate that companies first financed in times of
high prices and high idiosyncratic volatility are more likely to default. Column (2) includes
a number of company-level control variables: The firm age at first financing as reported
by VentureSource, the size of the investing syndicate, the log dollars raised and whether
the company is based in California or Massachusetts. Including these variables does not
qualitatively impact the result. Column (3) adds industry fixed effects to the regression,
which does not change the results appreciably.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 studies the effect of market conditions at first financing on firms’
probability of successfully completing an IPO. This is generally considered the best outcome
for a VC-backed company. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the firm has
a successful IPO, again expressed in percentage points. Column (4) shows that firms first
financed in high CIV times are more likely to successfully IPO. Interestingly, average stock
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Table 7: Investment Outcomes
This table reports results from OLS regressions looking at the probability of various firm outcomes. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) takes a value of one if the firm fails and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in columns (4)-(6) takes a value of one if the firm has a successful IPO and zero otherwise. Industry
fixed effects control for seven industries. Standard errors, clustered by quarter, in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Prob. of Default Prob. of IPO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CIVt 3.79*** 3.35** 3.50** 1.00*** 1.01*** 1.02***
(1.32) (1.36) (1.39) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Indus. Q 6.33*** 7.06*** 7.45*** -0.37 -0.56** -0.48*
(1.48) (1.51) (1.52) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
εCIVt,t+1 0.20 0.13 -0.04 0.62** 0.68** 0.73**
(1.37) (1.43) (1.44) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
rmt,t+1 0.92 0.06 0.50 0.51 0.86 1.13
(7.20) (7.15) (7.31) (1.48) (1.55) (1.52)
supply 0.13 0.62 0.71 -2.58*** -2.62*** -2.47***
(1.35) (1.40) (1.44) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41)
lage -0.49* -0.52** 0.14*** 0.17***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.05) (0.05)
syndsize 0.07 0.14 0.53*** 0.45***
(0.49) (0.48) (0.17) (0.17)
lraised -3.86*** -3.77*** 0.78*** 0.81***
(0.55) (0.54) (0.16) (0.15)
cali -2.92*** -2.04** 0.28 0.52**
(0.99) (0.97) (0.23) (0.24)
mass -6.72*** -5.79*** 0.26 0.32
(1.63) (1.65) (0.36) (0.36)
Industry F.E. N N Y N N Y
r2 0.030 0.042 0.050 0.018 0.022 0.027
N 11182 10370 10370 11182 10370 10370
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prices (at time of first financing) do not seem to greatly impact the probability that VC-
backed firms successfully IPO, implying that the increase observed in columns (1)-(3) comes
primarily from a decrease in the number of firms acquired. Finally, firms first financed
in times of high VC fund supply are markedly less likely to successfully IPO. Including
additional firm-level controls and industry fixed effects, as in columns (5) and (6) do not
change these results.
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I next investigate how changes in underlying asset volatility relate to changes in the VC
investment process. Table 8 reports results for regressions on the frequency of reinvestment.
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the same VC firm has a follow-on
investment after the round. In general, VC financing relationships are stable in the sense
that the same VC firm will usually continue to finance the firm after making an initial
investment. The results in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 8 indicate that rising idiosyncratic
volatility (εCIVt,t+1) and market prices (r
m
t,t+1) after the financing round are associated with
a greater probability of their being a follow-on financing event from the same VC firm.
Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(8) repeat the analysis in early and late rounds, respectively, where
early rounds are those that VentureSource has Identified as being seed, angel or first rounds
of investments. In general, early investment rounds are more likely to be involve follow-on
investments (65% vs. 52%) and the results in Table 8 imply that these probabilities are also
more strongly related to public market conditions. A one-standard-deviation movement in
idiosyncratic volatility is associated with a 4% greater probability of follow-on financing for
early rounds, while the probability of follow-on financing does not change for late financing
rounds. Market returns also have a greater impact on early financing rounds, with a one
standard deviation move in market prices associated with a 6% change in the probability
of follow-on financing for early rounds and only a 1.3%-1.9% change in later rounds.
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Table 9 investigates whether, conditional on there being a follow-on financing round, how
does the time until that round relate to any changes in underlying asset volatility. The de-
pendent variable, time until the next financing round, is measured as the natural logarithm
of the number of days until the next round. The results imply that, conditional on a new
financing round occurring, the round is significantly faster in times of rising asset volatility
as well as in times of rising market prices.
Finally, I investigate whether realized asset volatility shocks are correlated with returns for
individual portfolio company investments. In the theoretical motivation in Section 1.2, the
presence of a reinvestment option implies that the returns should depend on innovations
to idiosyncratic volatility after the company is first financed, and not on the level of id-
iosyncratic volatility at the time of financing. To test this hypothesis, I regress gross cash
multiples on levels and innovations of both CIV and market prices:
Mi,t = γ0 + γ1CIVt + γ2ε
CIV
t,t+1 + γ3Qt + γ4r
m
t,t+1 + δX + ηi,t.
The variable X is a potential vector of company characteristics and fixed effects.
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Results for this regression are in Table 10. Starting with column (1), which does not include
firm-level controls or fixed effects, we can see that the coefficient on the level of CIV at first
financing enters insignificantly, consistent with the theoretical motivation. The level of
asset volatility appears to be priced into portfolio company investments, consistent with
competitive financing markets. The innovation to CIV (εCIVt,t+1), on the other hand, enters
positively and significantly. Market prices enter similarly, with the coefficient Tobin’s Q
entering with only marginal significance and market returns after the investment strongly
statistically significant. Columns (2) and (3) include company-level controls and industry
fixed effects, neither of which materially impact these results dramatically. Columns (4)-(6)
and (7)-(9) repeat the analysis in early and late rounds, respectively. Similar to the results
reported in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, the return of early-stage investments are much more
strongly related to innovations in asset volatility than those for late investment rounds.
1.5. Conclusion
The contractual arrangements through which VC firms invest in their portfolio companies,
in particular the real option embedded in staged financing, lead these funds to be exposed to
changes in the idiosyncratic volatility of these companies. The idiosyncratic return volatility
of these companies is, in turn, exposed to aggregate levels of idiosyncratic volatility through
a common factor structure. I find that this channel explains a significant fraction of the
historical performance of VC investments.
At the asset class level, VC indexes from Cambridge Associates and Sand Hill Econometrics
show significant exposure to idiosyncratic volatility shocks, with a one standard deviation
quarterly shock leading to an 8% return in the CA index. This loading is even larger for a
benchmark index of early stage investment focused funds and is smaller for balanced- and
late-focused funds. An index of buyout funds shows no exposure to idiosyncratic volatility
shocks. I repeat the analysis using a tradeable proxy for idiosyncratic volatility shocks
constructed from equity options and find that the exposure to this proxy increases risk-
adjusted excess returns. One possible interpretation of this result is that investors who
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ignore this valuable risk exposure undervalue the returns to venture capital investments.
At the investment level, I find that positive innovations to idiosyncratic volatility that occur
during the fund’s life lead to greater fund performance relative to a market benchmark, and
that the shocks with the greatest impact are those that occur in years three and four
of the fund’s life. Again, funds that focus on early-stage investments, i.e. those with
more reinvestment options, experience much greater performance exposure to idiosyncratic
volatility shocks.
At the level of individual portfolio company investments, I find that the average cash mul-
tiple is greater for those investments that experience positive innovations to idiosyncratic
volatility early in their lives, but that the level of idiosyncratic volatility does not predict
returns, consistent with rational and competitive pricing in the market for entrepreneurial
finance.
47
1.6. Bibliography
Ang, A., Hodrick, R.J., Xing, Y. and Zhang, X., 2006. The crosssection of volatility and
expected returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(1), pp.259-299.
Bergemann, D. and Hege, U., 1998. Dynamic venture capital financing, learning and moral
hazard. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(6-8), pp.703-735.
Bergemann, D. and Hege, U., 2005. The financing of innovation: Learning and stopping.
RAND Journal of Economics, pp.719-752.
Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Plantin, G. and Rochet, J.C., 2007. Dynamic security design:
Convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. The Review of Economic
Studies, 74(2), pp.345-390.
Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets:
banks versus stock markets. Journal of financial economics, 47(3), pp.243-277.
Black, F. and Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The
journal of political economy, 81(3), pp.637-654.
Blosser, S. and Woodward, S.E., 2009. VC index calculation white paper. Available at
http://www.sandhillecon.com/pdf/SandHillIndexWhitePaper.pdf
Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M.P. and Whitelaw, R.F., 1994. A tale of three schools: Insights
on autocorrelations of short-horizon stock returns. Review of financial studies, 7(3),
pp.539-573.
Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G. and Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become
more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk. The Journal of Finance,
56(1), pp.1-43.
Carhart, M.M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of finance,
48
52(1), pp.57-82.
Cochrane, J.H., 2005. The risk and return of venture capital. Journal of financial economics,
75(1), pp.3-52.
Constantinides, G.M. and Duffie, D., 1996. Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers.
Journal of Political economy, pp.219-240.
Cornelli, F. and Yosha, O., 2003. Stage financing and the role of convertible securities. The
Review of Economic Studies, 70(1), pp.1-32.
Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T. F., and Puri, M. (2011). A survey of venture capital research
(No. w17523). National Bureau of Economic Research.
DeMarzo, P.M. and Fishman, M.J., 2007. Optimal long-term financial contracting. Review
of Financial Studies, 20(6), pp.2079-2128.
DeMarzo, P.M. and Sannikov, Y., 2006. Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital
Structure in a ContinuousTime Agency Model. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), pp.2681-
2724.
Dimson, E., 1979. Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading. Journal
of Financial Economics, 7(2), pp.197-226.
Engle, R. and Figlewski, S., 2015. Modeling the dynamics of correlations among implied
volatilities. Review of Finance, 19(3), pp.991-1018.
Ewens, M., Jones, C.M. and Rhodes-Kropf, M., 2013. The price of diversifiable risk in
venture capital and private equity. Review of Financial Studies, 26(8), pp.1854-1889.
Ewens, M., Rhodes-Kropf, M. and Strebulaev, I., 2016. Inside rounds and venture capital
returns. Unpublished Working Paper
Fluck, Z., Garrison, K. and Myers, S.C., 2006. Venture capital contracting: Staged financing
49
and syndication of later-stage investments. NBER Working Paper.
Gompers, P.A., 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital.
The journal of finance, 50(5), pp.1461-1489.
Hall, R.E. and Woodward, S.E., 2007. The incentives to start new companies: Evidence
from venture capital (No. w13056). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hall, R.E. and Woodward, S.E., 2010. The burden of the nondiversifiable risk of en-
trepreneurship. The American Economic Review, 100(3), pp.1163-1194.
Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N., 2014. Private equity performance: What do
we know?. The Journal of Finance, 69(5), pp.1851-1882.
Heaton, J. and Lucas, D., 2004. Capital structure, hurdle rates, and portfolio choice inter-
actions in an entrepreneurial firm. Unpublished working paper. University of Chicago
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M., 2000. The interaction between product market and financing
strategy: The role of venture capital. Review of Financial studies,13(4), pp.959-984.
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M., 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of startup
firms: Empirical evidence. The journal of finance, 57(1), pp.169-197.
Herskovic, B., Kelly, B., Lustig, H. and Van Nieuwerburgh, S., 2016. The common factor
in idiosyncratic volatility: Quantitative asset pricing implications. Journal of Financial
Economics, 119(2), pp.249-283.
Jurado, K., Ludvigson, S.C. and Ng, S., 2015. Measuring uncertainty. The American
Economic Review, 105(3), pp.1177-1216. Vancouver
Kaplan, S.N. and Lerner, J., 2016. Venture Capital Data: Opportunities and Challenges
(No. w22500). National Bureau of Economic Research.
50
Kaplan, S.N. and Schoar, A., 2005. Private equity performance: Returns, persistence, and
capital flows. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), pp.1791-1823.
Kaplan, S.N. and Strmberg, P., 2003. Financial contracting theory meets the real world:
An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. The Review of Economic Studies,
70(2), pp.281-315.
Korteweg, A. and Nagel, S., 2016. Riskadjusting the returns to venture capital. The Journal
of Finance, Forthcoming.
Korteweg, A. and Sorensen, M., 2010. Risk and return characteristics of venture capital-
backed entrepreneurial companies. Review of Financial Studies, 23(10), pp.3738-3772.
Lerner, J., 1995. Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. The Journal of
Finance, 50(1), pp.301-318.
Lo, A.W. and MacKinlay, A.C., 1990. An econometric analysis of nonsynchronous trading.
Journal of Econometrics, 45(1-2), pp.181-211.
Mankiw, G.N., 1986. The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks.
Journal of Financial Economics 17, pp.211219.
Merton, R.C., 1973. Theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of economics and
management science, 4(1), pp.141-183.
Metrick, A., and Yasuda, A., 2011. Venture capital and the finance of innovation, 2nd
Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Nanda, R. and Rhodes-Kropf, M., 2013. Investment cycles and startup innovation. Journal
of Financial Economics, 110(2), pp.403-418.
Nanda, R. and Rhodes-Kropf, M., 2016. Financing Risk and Innovation. Management
Science, Forthcoming.
51
Peters, R.H. and Taylor, L.A., 2016. Intangible capital and the investment-q relation.
Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Sorensen, M. and Jagannathan, R., 2015. The public market equivalent and private equity
performance. Financial Analysts Journal, 71(4), pp.43-50.
Woodward, S.E., 2009. Measuring risk for venture capital and private equity portfolios.
Available at SSRN 1458050.
Woodward, S.E. and Hall, R.E., 2004. Benchmarking the returns to venture (No. w10202).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
52
CHAPTER 2 : Intangible Capital and the Investment-q Relation
2.1. Introduction
The neoclassical theory of investment was developed more than 30 years ago, when firms
mainly owned physical assets such as property, plant, and equipment (PP&E). As a result,
empirical tests of the theory have focused almost exclusively on physical capital. Since
then, the US economy has shifted toward service- and technology-based industries, which
has made intangible assets such as human capital, innovative products, brands, patents,
software, customer relationships, databases, and distribution systems increasingly impor-
tant. Corrado and Hulten (2010) estimate that intangible capital makes up 34% of firms’
total capital in recent years. Despite the importance of intangible capital, researchers have
almost always excluded it when testing investment theories.
Is there a role for intangible capital in the neoclassical theory of investment? If so, how must
empirical tests be adapted? Is the theory still relevant in an economy increasingly dominated
by intangible capital? For example, the Hayashi (1982) classic q-theory of investment
predicts that Tobin’s q, the ratio of capital’s market value to its replacement cost, perfectly
summarizes a firm’s investment opportunities. As a result, Tobin’s q has become “arguably
the most common regressor in corporate finance” (Erickson and Whited, 2012, p. 1286).
How should researchers proxy for investment opportunities in an increasingly intangible
economy? And how well do those proxies work?
To answer these questions, we revisit the basic empirical facts about the relation between
corporate investment, Tobin’s q, and free cash flow. A very large investment literature,
both in corporate finance and macroeconomics, is built upon these fundamental facts, so
it is important to understand how the facts change when accounting for intangible capital.
We show that some facts do change significantly, and we discuss the implications for our
theories of investment. Most important, we show that the classic q theory of investment,
despite originally being designed to explain physical investment, also helps explain intangible
53
investment. In other words, the neoclassical theory of investment is still relevant. An
important component of our analysis is a new Tobin’s q proxy that accounts for intangible
capital. We show that this new proxy captures firms’ investment opportunities better than
other popular proxies, thus offering a simple way to improve corporate finance regressions
without additional econometrics.
To guide our empirical work, we begin with a theory of a firm that invests optimally in
physical and intangible capital over time. The theory is a standard neoclassical investment-
q theory in the spirit of Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994). Like physical capital,
intangible capital is costly to obtain and helps produce future profits, albeit with some
risk. For this fundamental reason, it makes sense to treat intangible capital as capital
in the neoclassical framework. Our theory predicts that a firm’s physical and intangible
investment rates should both be explained well by a version of Tobin’s q that we call “total
q,” which equals the firm’s market value divided by the sum of its physical and intangible
capital stocks.
We test this and other predictions using data on public US firms from 1975 to 2011. We mea-
sure a firm’s intangible capital as the sum of its knowledge capital and organization capital.
We interpret research and development (R&D) spending as an investment in knowledge
capital, and we apply the perpetual-inventory method to a firm’s past R&D to measure
the replacement cost of its knowledge capital. We similarly interpret a fraction of past
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) spending as an investment in organization
capital, which includes human capital, brand, customer relationships, and distribution sys-
tems. Our measure of intangible capital builds on the measures of Lev and Radhakrishnan
(2005), Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009), Corrado and Hulten (2010, 2014), Eisfeldt and
Papanikolaou (2013, 2014), Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim (2013), and Zhang (2014). We
define a firm’s total capital as the sum of its physical and intangible capital, both measured
at replacement cost. Guided by our theory, we measure total q as the firm’s market value
divided by its total capital, and we scale the physical and intangible investment rates by
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total capital.
While our intangible-capital measure has limitations, we believe, and the data confirm,
that an imperfect proxy is better than setting intangible capital to zero. A benefit of the
measure is that it is easily computed for all public US firms back to 1975, and it requires
only Compustat data and other easily downloaded data. Our data on firms’ total q and
intangible capital can be downloaded from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Our analysis begins with ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions of investment on
q. Consistent with our theory, total q explains physical and intangible investment roughly
equally well. Their within-firm R2 values are 21% and 28%, respectively. Total q explains
the sum of physical and intangible investment (total investment) even better, delivering an
R2 of 33%. Judging by R2, the neoclassical theory of investment works at least as well
for intangible capital as for physical capital, and it works even better for an all-inclusive
measure of capital. Also consistent with our theory, the literature’s standard investment
regression, which excludes intangible capital, typically delivers lower R2 values.
According to the theory, physical and intangible investment should co-move, because they
share the same marginal productivity of capital, as proxied by total q. The data support
this view: The within-firm correlation between physical and intangible investment is 31%
but drops to 17% after controlling for total q.
Throughout the corporate finance literature, researchers use Tobin’s q to proxy for firms’
investment opportunities. Our OLS R2 values help evaluate these proxies. We find that
including intangible capital in our q measure produces a superior proxy for investment op-
portunities, no matter how we measure investment. We compare total q with the investment
literature’s standard q measure, which scales firm value by physical capital (PP&E) alone.
Total q is better at explaining physical, intangible, and total investment, as well as R&D
investment and the literature’s standard investment measure, capital expenditure (CAPX)
scaled by PP&E. It is also popular to measure Tobin’s q as the firm’s market value scaled
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by the book value of assets. The problem with this measure is that “Assets” on the balance
sheet excludes the vast majority of firms’ intangible capital, because US accounting rules
treat R&D and SG&A as operating expenses, not capital investments. Like Erickson and
Whited (2006, 2012), we find that market-to-book–assets ratios are especially poor proxies
for investment opportunities.
The OLS regressions suffer from two well-known problems. First, the slopes on q are biased
due to measurement error in q. Second, the OLS R2 depends not just on how well q explains
investment, but also on how well our q proxies explain the true, unobservable q. To address
these problems, we reestimate the investment models using the Erickson, Jiang, and Whited
(2014) cumulant estimator. This estimator produces unbiased slopes and a statistic τ2 that
measures how close our q proxy is to the true, unobservable q. Specifically, τ2 is the R2
from a hypothetical regression of our q proxy on the true q. We find that τ2 is 21% higher
when we include intangible capital in the investment-q regression, implying that our new q
proxy is closer to the true q.
According to our theory, slope coefficients of investment on total q help measure capital
adjustment costs. The inverse q-slope for physical (intangible) investment measures the
convex component of physical (intangible) capital’s adjustment costs. We find that in-
tangible investment’s q-slope is roughly half as large as physical investment’s, implying
intangible capital’s convex adjustment costs are twice as large as those for physical capital.
This finding supports the literature’s conjecture that intangible capital is costlier than phys-
ical capital to adjust, because adjusting intangible capital often requires replacing highly
trained employees (e.g., Grabowski, 1968; Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009). An im-
portant implication of our result is that firms adjust more slowly to changes in investment
opportunities as the economy shifts toward intangible capital. We also find that accounting
for intangibles roughly doubles the q-slope for physical investment, implying significantly
lower convex adjustment costs for physical capital than previously believed.
Like other simple q theories, ours predicts that cash flow should not help explain invest-
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ment after controlling for q. Researchers typically measure cash flow as profits net of R&D
and SG&A. Because R&D and at least part of SG&A are actually investments, one should
add them back to measure cash flow available for investment. After making this adjust-
ment, we find that physical investment becomes more sensitive to cash flow than previously
believed. On this dimension, the neoclassical theory fits the data worse after accounting
for intangibles. In contrast, the R&D component of intangible investment is insensitive to
cash flow, supporting the theory. Because SG&A’s investment component is difficult to
measure, it remains unclear whether intangible investment overall is more sensitive than
physical investment to cash flow. Financing constraints are unlikely to explain the oppos-
ing cash flow results for physical and R&D capital, as financing constraints are arguably
more severe for R&D capital due to its lower collateral value (Almeida and Campello, 2007;
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim, 2013). More recent theories predict an investment–cash
flow sensitivity even without financing constraints.1 For example, diseconomies of scale can
make cash flow informative about investment opportunities, even controlling for Tobin’s q.
Without a full structural estimation, it is difficult to tell whether our cash flow results are
driven by differences in financing constraints, diseconomies of scale, or some other source.
Several important investment studies use data only from manufacturing firms.2 Surprisingly,
we find that the classic q theory fits the data better outside the manufacturing industry
and, more generally, in firms and years with more intangible capital. Investment is usually
better explained by q and is less sensitive to cash flow in subsamples with more intangibles.
These results even hold using the literature’s standard measures that exclude intangibles.
Again, our results imply that the neoclassical theory of investment is just as relevant, if
not more so, in an increasingly intangible economy. Why the theory fits better in high-
intangible settings remains unclear. We find no robust evidence that high-intangible firms
1Examples include Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cooper and Ejarque (2003), Hennessy and Whited (2007),
Abel and Eberly (2011), Gourio and Rudanko (2014), and Abel (2016).
2Examples include Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Almeida and Campello (2007), and Erickson
and Whited (2012). A common reason is that manufacturing firms’ capital is easier to measure. Our τ2
statistics confirm that the literature’s standard q proxy has less measurement error in the manufacturing
industry compared with other industries.
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are closer to the theory’s ideal of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Also,
high-intangible firms arguably face more financing constraints, which should make theory
fit worse, not better.
Some of our main results are even stronger in macroeconomic time series data. For example,
the literature’s standard investment-q regression, which excludes intangibles, delivers an R2
of just 4%, whereas the regression including intangible capital produces an R2 of 61%. In
first differences, total q explains physical and intangible capital roughly equally well. Again,
the neoclassical theory of investment applies just as well, if not better, to intangible capital.
The empirical investment-q literature is extensive and dates back at least to Ciccolo (1975)
and Abel (1980). Hassett and Hubbard (1997) and Caballero (1999) review the literature.
Tests of the classic q theory using physical capital have been disappointing. Investment is
typically sensitive to cash flow, is explained poorly by q (low R2), and produces implausibly
large adjustment-cost parameters (low q-slopes). We show that including intangible capital
helps solve the last two problems but not the first one. Other attempts to solve these
problems with better measurement include using a fundamental q instead of market values
directly (Abel and Blanchard, 1986), using bond prices (Philippon, 2009), correcting for
measurement error (Erickson and Whited, 2000, 2012; Erickson, Jiang, and Whited, 2014),
and using state variables directly (Gala and Gomes, 2013). We also correct for measurement
error, and we show that including intangibles yields even larger improvements than using
bond prices.
Our paper is not the first to examine the empirical relation between intangible investment
and Tobin’s q. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find a positive relation between investment
in organization capital and q. Almeida and Campello (2007) and others use q and cash flow
to forecast R&D investment. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) use q to forecast the sum of
physical investment and R&D. Closer to our specifications, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2002)
measure investment as the sum of CAPX, R&D, and SG&A, and they regress them on q.
Gourio and Rudanko (2014) examine the relation between q and investment in customer
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capital, a type of intangible capital. All these papers use a q proxy that excludes intangibles
from the denominator. Besides having a different focus, our paper is the first to include
all types of intangible capital not just in investment, but also in Tobin’s q and cash flow.
Including intangibles in all three measures is important for delivering our results. Belo, Lin,
and Vitorino (2014) show that physical and brand investment are both procyclical, which
is related to our co-movement result, but they do not examine Tobin’s q.
Almeida and Campello (2007) examine how asset tangibility and financial constraints af-
fect the investment–cash flow relation. Like us, they find a higher investment–cash flow
sensitivity for firms using less intangibles. Unlike our measures of asset intangibility, theirs
exclude firms’ internally created intangible assets, which we find make up the vast majority
of intangible capital.
Li, Liu, and Xue (2014) structurally estimate a q-theory model that includes intangible
capital. Like us, they find that intangible capital has larger adjustment-cost parameters
than physical capital and that including intangibles decreases physical capital’s estimated
adjustment costs. Unlike us, they focus on the cross section of stock returns, and they
exclude organization capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents our theory of investment in physical
and intangible capital. Section 2.3 describes the data and intangible-capital measure we
use to test the theory’s predictions. Section 2.4 presents full-sample results, and Section 2.5
compares results across different types of firms, industries, and years. Section 2.6 contains
results for the overall macroeconomy. Section 2.7 explores the robustness of our empirical
results, and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Intangible capital and the neoclassical theory of investment
In this section, we review the neoclassical theory of investment, and we argue that intangible
capital fits well into the theory. We simplify and modify the Abel and Eberly (1994) theory
of investment under uncertainty to include two capital goods that we interpret as physical
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and intangible capital. We present a stylized model, as our goal is to provide theoretical
motivation for our empirical work, not to make a theoretical contribution. Wildasin (1984),
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), and others already provide theories of investment in multiple
capital goods. We first present the model’s assumptions and predictions, and then we
discuss them.
2.2.1. Model assumptions and empirical implications
The model features an infinitely lived, perfectly competitive firm i that holds Kphyit units
of physical capital and Kintit units of intangible capital at time t. The firm’s total capital
is defined as Ktot = Kphy + Kint. At each instant t, the firm chooses the investment rates
Iphy and Iint that maximize firm value Vit:
Vit = max
Iphyi,t+s, I
int
i,t+s
∫ ∞
0
Et[Π
(
Ktoti,t+s, εi,t+s
)− cphyi (Iphyi,t+s,Ktoti,t+s, pphyi,t+s)
−cinti
(
Iinti,t+s,K
tot
i,t+s, p
int
i,t+s
)
]e−rsds, (2.1)
subject to
dKm = (Im − δKm) dt, m = phy, int. (2.2)
Both types of capital depreciate at the same rate δ. The profit function Π depends on a
shock ε and is assumed linearly homogenous in Ktot. The two investment-cost functions c
equal
cmi
(
Im,Ktot, pm
)
= pmIm +Ktot
[
ζmi
Im
Ktot
+
γmi
2
(
Im
Ktot
)2]
, m = phy, int, (2.3)
where γi > 0. The first term denotes the direct purchase or sale cost of investment, with
each new unit of capital costing pm. The second term equals the cost of adjusting the stock
of capital type m. Capital prices pphyit and p
int
it , along with profitability shock εit, fluctuate
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over time according to a general stochastic diffusion process:
dyit = µ (yit) dt+ Σ (yit) dBit, (2.4)
where yit =
[
εit p
phy
it p
int
it
]′
.
We have four main predictions. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Prediction 1. Physical and intangible capital share the same marginal q. Marginal q equals
average q, the ratio of firm value to its total capital stock:
∂Vit
∂Kphyit
=
∂Vit
∂Kintit
=
∂Vit
∂Ktotit
=
Vit
Ktotit
≡ qtot
(
εit, p
phy
it , p
int
it
)
. (2.5)
Marginal q equals ∂V/∂K and measures the benefit of adding an incremental unit of capital
(either physical or intangible) to the firm. Marginal q equals average q, because we assume
constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and perfect substitutes in production and
depreciation. This prediction provides a rationale for measuring Tobin’s q as qtot, firm
value divided by Ktot, the sum of physical and intangible capital. The value of qtot depends
endogenously on the shock ε and the two capital prices.
The firm chooses its optimal investment rates by equating their marginal q and their
marginal cost of investment. Applying this condition to Eq. (2.3) yields Prediction 2.
Prediction 2. The firm’s optimal physical and intangible investment rates follow
ιphyit =
Iphyit
Ktotit
=
1
γphyi
(
qtotit − ζphyi − pphyit
)
(2.6)
ιintit =
Iintit
Ktotit
=
1
γinti
(
qtotit − ζinti − pintit
)
. (2.7)
Prediction 2 says that the physical and intangible investment rates, both scaled by total
capital, vary with qtot. One empirical implication is that physical and intangible invest-
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ment rates should be correlated. The correlation might not be perfect, though, because
adjustment-cost parameters might not be perfectly correlated across firms, and the prices
pphyit and p
int
it might not be perfectly correlated either across firms or over time.
Predictions 3 and 4 follow immediately from Prediction 2 and form the basis of our empirical
work. Consider a panel of firms indexed by i. We assume parameters γphy and γint are
constant across firms, but other parameters and shocks can vary across firms. We assume
the two capital prices pmit can be decomposed as p
m
i + p
m
t .
Prediction 3. In an OLS panel regression of ιphyit on q
tot
it and firm and time fixed effects
(FEs), the slope on q equals 1/γphy. If the dependent variable is instead ιintit , the q−slope
equals 1/γint. If the dependent variable is ιtotit , the q−slope equals 1/γphy + 1/γint. Any
other regressors, such as free cash flow, should not enter significantly if added to any of
these regressions.
Prediction 3 says that total q helps explain all three investment measures, and it shows
that the OLS slopes identify the adjustment-cost parameters γ. The firm and year FEs are
needed to absorb the terms −ζi − pit in Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7).
To our knowledge, Prediction 4 is new to the literature. It helps explain the investment lit-
erature’s typical regression, which excludes intangible capital and instead scales investment
and q by physical capital alone.
Prediction 4. Define q∗it = Vit/K
phy
it and ι
∗
it = I
phy
it /K
phy
it . In an OLS panel regression of
ι∗it on q
∗
it and firm and time fixed effects, the slope coefficient is a downward-biased estimate
of 1/γphy, and the R2 is lower than the R2 from the regressions in Prediction 3.
According to our theory, this regression is misspecified, because the ratio −Ktotit /Kphyit
is part of the regression’s disturbance and cannot be explained by the FEs. Its q-slope
is downward-biased, meaning it produces upward-biased estimates of the adjustment-cost
parameter γphy, because q∗it depends on the ratio K
tot
it /K
phy
it , making the regressor negatively
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related to the disturbance.
At this point, we have imposed several restrictive assumptions. To help judge the model’s
empirical relevance, we establish one last prediction and use it as a consistency check in our
empirical work. This last prediction links firms’ use of intangible capital to their adjustment
costs and q-slopes. If we impose the additional assumptions that physical and intangible
capital have the same linear adjustment-cost parameters (ζphyi = ζ
int
i ) and purchase prices
(pphyit = p
int
it ), then
lim
t→∞
Kintit
Ktotit
=
γphy
γphy + γint
=
βint
βint + βphy
, (2.8)
where βint and βphy are the Prediction 3 slopes of ιint and ιphy, respectively, on qtot. In-
tuitively, if physical and intangible capital are identical except for their adjustment-cost
parameters γ, then a firm holds relatively less intangible capital if intangible capital is
costlier to adjust (γint > γphy). Section 5 performs a consistency check by comparing the
Eq. (2.8) ratio of regression slopes across firms with different amounts of intangible capital.
2.2.2. Discussion
To summarize, our simple theory predicts that total q helps explains physical, intangible,
and total investments when we scale them by the firm’s total capital. It also illustrates how
investment regressions can identify the convex part (γ) of capital adjustment costs. The
theory also predicts that including intangible capital produces a better-specified investment
regression and more accurate adjustment-cost estimates.
Next, we discuss the theory’s assumptions and limitations. Overall, we argue that intangible
capital fits well into the neoclassical framework.
Conceptually, spending on intangible assets qualifies as a capital investment, because it
reduces current cash flow to increase future cash flow (Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, 2005,
2009). Ample evidence exists that intangible investments increase firms’ future profits,
as our theory assumes. A large R&D literature (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis, 1996) shows
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that R&D investments increase firms’ future profits. Recognizing this fact, the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) began capitalizing R&D in satellite accounts in 1994 and in core
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) in 2013. A large marketing literature (e.g.,
Aaker, 1991; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey, 1997) shows that firms with stronger brands
earn higher profits and are worth more. More generally, Eisfeldt and Papanikoloau (2013)
show that firms using more organization capital are more productive after accounting for
physical capital and labor. Even though a firm does not own its workers, employee training
builds the firm’s human capital, because training is costly and increases the firm’s future
profits.
While employee training and brand building can entail relatively low risk, investments
such as R&D projects are highly risky and sometimes fail completely. The same is true
for physical investments, though. Our theory is designed to handle investments with risky
payoffs, so payoff risk is no reason to exclude intangible capital from the neoclassical theory.
In addition to payoff risk, firms face depreciation risk. Our theory assumes a constant
depreciation rate for intangible capital, whereas the true rate is likely random. For example,
writing off a large portion of knowledge capital could be appropriate when a firm narrowly
loses a patent race. Physical capital’s true depreciation rate is also likely random, however.
For example, an unexpected product-market change could make a machine obsolete. Again,
no conceptual difference exists between physical and intangible capital here, although there
could be a difference of degree.
When researchers test investment theories, they usually measure investment as CAPX and
capital as PP&E. These two measures add together physical assets that are conceptually
very different from each other, such as timberland, medical equipment, oil reserves, comput-
ers, buildings, and so on. By using such measures, researchers implicitly treat these physical
assets as perfect substitutes. Similarly, our theory adds together many different types of
intangible assets into Kint, and then it assumes the firm’s profits depend on Ktot, the sum
of physical and intangible capital. We therefore treat all assets as perfect substitutes in pro-
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ducing profits, although we do allow them to have potentially different adjustment costs. In
our opinion, a natural first step is to treat intangible capital the same way researchers for
decades have treated physical capital. In reality, physical and intangible capital could be
complements, not substitutes. One might therefore expect our empirical measures, which
simply add together all capital, to produce poor results. We find the opposite, which is
somewhat surprising and suggests that our simple model provides a useful approximation
of reality.
The theory highlights an important limitation of investment regressions. Whited (1994)
and Erickson and Whited (2000) explain that investment regressions cannot identify the
level of adjustment costs. For example, our theory predicts that the linear adjustment-
cost parameters ζ are not separately identified from firm-specific capital prices p. The
investment regression identifies only the quadratic adjustment-cost parameters γ, meaning
the investment regression can identify only the convex component of adjustment costs.
This convex component is interesting, however, as it determines how investment responds
to investment opportunities.
2.3. Firm-level data
Our sample includes all Compustat firms except regulated utilities (Standard Industrial
Classification codes 4900–4999), financial firms (6000–6999), and firms categorized as public
service, international affairs, or non-operating establishments (9000+). We also exclude
firms with missing or non-positive book value of assets or sales and firms with less that
$5 million in physical capital, as is standard in the literature. We use data from 1975 to
2011, although we use earlier data to estimate firms’ intangible capital. Our sample starts
in 1975, because this is the first year that the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
requires firms to report R&D. We winsorize all regression variables at the 1% level to remove
outliers.
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2.3.1. Tobin’s q
Guided by our theory, we measure total q by scaling firm value by the sum of physical and
intangible capital:
qtotit =
Vit
Kphyit +K
int
it
. (2.9)
We measure the replacement cost of physical capital, Kphy, as the book value of property,
plant, and equipment (Compustat item ppegt). Subsection 3.2 defines our measure of Kint,
the replacement cost of intangible capital. We measure the firm’s market value V as the
market value of outstanding equity (Compustat items prcc f times csho), plus the book
value of debt (Compustat items dltt+dlc), minus the firm’s current assets (Compustat item
act), which include cash, inventory, and marketable securities.
For comparison, we examine the literature’s standard Tobin’s q measure used by Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Erickson and Whited (2012), and many others:
q∗it =
Vit
Kphyit
. (2.10)
Erickson and Whited (2006, 2012) compare several alternate Tobin’s q measures, includ-
ing the market-to-book–assets ratio, and they find that q∗ best explains investment. The
correlation between q∗ and qtot is 0.82.
2.3.2. Intangible capital
We briefly review the US accounting rules for intangible capital before defining our measure.3
The accounting rules depend on whether the firm creates the intangible asset internally or
purchases it externally.
Intangible assets created within a firm are expensed on the income statement and almost
never appear as assets on the balance sheet. For example, a firm’s spending to develop
3Chapter 12 in Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield (2010) provides a useful summary of the accounting rules
for intangible assets. The authors also provide references to relevant FASB codifications.
66
knowledge, patents, or software is expensed as R&D. Advertising to build brand capital
is a selling expense within SG&A. Employee training to build human capital is a general
or administrative expense within SG&A. There are a few exceptions, in which internally
created intangibles are capitalized on the balance sheet, but these are small in magnitude.4
When a firm purchases an intangible asset externally, for example, by acquiring another
firm, the firm typically capitalizes the asset on the balance sheet as part of Intangible
Assets, which equals the sum of Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets. The asset is booked
in Other Intangible Assets if the acquired asset is separately identifiable, such as a patent,
software, or client list. Acquired assets that are not separately identifiable, such as human
capital, are in Goodwill. When an intangible asset becomes impaired, firms are required to
write down its book value.
We define the replacement cost of intangible capital, denoted Kint, to be the sum of the
firm’s externally purchased and internally created intangible capital. We measure exter-
nally purchased intangible capital as Intangible Assets from the balance sheet (Compustat
item intan). We set this value to zero if missing. We keep Goodwill in Intangible Assets
in our main analysis, because Goodwill does include the fair cost of acquiring intangible
assets that are not separately identifiable. Because Goodwill can be contaminated by non-
intangibles, such as a market premium for physical assets, we also try excluding Goodwill
from external intangibles and show that our results are almost unchanged (Section 7). Our
mean (median) firm purchases only 19% (3%) of its intangible capital externally, meaning
the vast majority of firms’ intangible assets are missing from their balance sheets. There are
important outliers, however. For example, 41% of Google’s intangible capital in 2013 had
been purchased externally. Including these externally purchased intangibles is an innovation
in our measure relative to those in the literature.
4Our measure captures these exceptions via balance sheet Intangible Assets. Firms capitalize the legal
costs, consulting fees, and registration fees incurred when developing a patent or trademark. A firm can
start capitalizing software spending only after the product reaches technological feasibility (for externally
sold software) or reaches the coding phase (for internally used software). The resulting software asset is part
of Other Intangible Assets (intano) in Compustat.
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Measuring the replacement cost of internally created intangible assets is difficult, as they
appear nowhere on the balance sheet. Fortunately, we can construct a proxy by accumu-
lating past intangible investments, as reported on firms’ income statements. We define the
stock of internal intangible capital as the sum of knowledge capital and organization capital.
A firm develops knowledge capital by spending on R&D. We estimate a firm’s knowledge
capital by accumulating past R&D spending using the perpetual inventory method:
Git = (1− δR&D)Gi,t−1 +R&Dit, (2.11)
where Git is the end-of-period stock of knowledge capital, δR&D is its depreciation rate, and
R&Dit is real expenditures on R&D during the year. The BEA uses a similar method to
capitalize R&D, as do practitioners when valuing companies (Damodaran, 1999, 2001). For
δR&D, we use the BEA’s industry-specific R&D depreciation rates.
5 We measure annual
R&D using the Compustat variable xrd. We use Compustat data back to 1950 to compute
Eq. (2.11), but our regressions include only observations starting in 1975. Starting in 1977,
we set R&D to zero when missing, following Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and others.6
One challenge in applying the perpetual inventory method in Eq. (2.11) is choosing a
value for Gi0, the capital stock in the firm’s first non-missing Compustat record, which
usually coincides with the initial public offering (IPO). We estimate Gi0 using data on
the firm’s founding year, R&D spending in its first Compustat record, and average pre-
IPO R&D growth rates. With these data, we estimate the firm’s R&D spending in each
year between its founding and appearance in Compustat. We apply a similar approach to
5The BEA’s R&D depreciation rates are from the analysis of Li (2012). The depreciation rates range
from 10% in the pharmaceutical industry to 40% for computers and peripheral equipment. Following the
BEA’s guidance, we use a depreciation rate of 15% for industries not in Li’s Table 4. Our results are virtually
unchanged if we set δR&D equal to 10%, 15%, or 20% for all industries (Table 19).
6We start in 1977 to give firms two years to comply with FASB’s 1975 R&D reporting requirement. If
we see a firm with R&D equal to zero or missing in 1977, we assume the firm was typically not an R&D
spender before 1977, so we set any missing R&D values before 1977 to zero. Otherwise, before 1977, we
either interpolate between the most recent non-missing R&D values (if such observations exist) or we use
the method in Appendix A (if those observations do not exist). Starting in 1977, we make exceptions in
cases in which the firm’s assets are also missing. These are likely years when the firm was privately owned.
In such cases, we interpolate R&D values using the nearest non-missing values.
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SG&A. Appendix B provides additional details. Section 2.7 shows that a simpler measure
assuming Gi0 = 0 produces an even stronger investment-q relation than our main measure.
We consider that simpler measure a reasonable alternate proxy for investment opportunities.
Next, we measure the stock of organization capital by accumulating a fraction of past
SG&A spending using the perpetual inventory method, as in Eq. (2.11). The logic is that
at least part of SG&A represents an investment in organization capital through advertising,
spending on distribution systems, employee training, and payments to strategy consultants.
We follow Hulten and Hao (2008), Eisfeldt and Papanikoloau (2014), and Zhang (2014) in
counting only 30% of SG&A spending as an investment in intangible capital. We interpret
the remaining 70% as operating costs that support the current period’s profits. Section 2.7
shows that our conclusions still go through, albeit with smaller magnitudes, if we use values
other than 30%. We follow Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim (2013) in using a depreciation
rate of δSG&A = 20%, and in Section 2.7 we show that our conclusions are robust to alternate
depreciation rates.
Measuring SG&A from Compustat data is not trivial. Companies typically report SG&A
and R&D separately. Compustat, however, almost always adds them together in a variable
misleadingly labeled “Selling, General and Administrative Expense” (item xsga). We must
therefore subtract xrd from xsga to isolate the SG&A that companies report. Appendix B
provides additional details.
Our measure of internally created organization capital is almost identical to that of Eisfeldt
and Papanikolaou (2012, 2013, 2014). They validate the measure in several ways. They
show a positive correlation between firms’ use of organization capital and the Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) managerial quality score. This score is associated with higher firm prof-
itability, production efficiency, and productivity of information technology (IT) (Bloom,
Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2010). Eisfeldt and Papanikoloau (2013) show that firms using
more organization capital are more productive after accounting for physical capital and la-
bor, spend more on IT, and employ higher-skilled workers. They show that firms with more
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organization capital list the loss of key personnel as a risk factor more often in their 10-K
filings. Practitioners also use our approach. A popular textbook on value investing recom-
mends capitalizing SG&A to measure assets missing from the balance sheet (Greenwald,
Kahn, Sonkin, and Van Biema, 2004).
Our measure of intangible capital has the benefit of being easily computed for the full
Compustat sample. The measure has limitations, however, as discussed in Subsection 2.2.
Subsection 2.4.2 addresses concerns about measurement error bias, and Section 2.7 shows
that our conclusions are robust to several alternate ways of measuring intangible capital.
Overall, we believe, and the data confirm, that an imperfect proxy for intangible capital is
better than setting it to zero.
2.3.3. Investment
Guided by our theory, we measure the firm’s physical, intangible, and total investment rates
as
ιphyit =
Iphyit
Ktoti,t−1
, ιintit =
Iintit
Ktoti,t−1
, ιtotit = ι
phy
it + ι
int
it . (2.12)
We measure physical investment Iphy as capital expenditures (Compustat item capx), and
we measure intangible investment, Iint, as R&D + (0.3 × SG&A). This definition assumes
30% of SG&A represents an investment, as we assume when estimating capital stocks. For
comparison, we examine the literature’s standard physical investment measure, denoted ι∗
in our theory:
ι∗it =
Iphyit
Kphyi,t−1
. (2.13)
The correlation between ιphy and ι∗ is 0.83.
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2.3.4. Cash flow
Erickson and Whited (2012), Almeida and Campello (2007), and others measure free cash
flow as
c∗it =
IBit +DPit
Kphyi,t−1
, (2.14)
where IB is income before extraordinary items and DP is depreciation expense. The mea-
sure c∗ is the pre-depreciation free cash flow available for physical investment or distribution
to shareholders. One shortcoming of c∗ is that it treats R&D and SG&A as operating ex-
penses, not investments. In addition to the standard measure c∗, we use an alternate cash
flow measure that recognizes R&D and part of SG&A as investments. We add intangible
investments back into the free cash flow so that we measure the profits available for total,
not just physical, investment:
ctotit =
IBit +DPit + I
int
it (1− κ)
Kphyi,t−1 +K
int
i,t−1
. (2.15)
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) similarly adjust earnings for intangible investments, as do prac-
titioners (Damodaran, 1999, 2001). Because accounting rules allow firms to expense intan-
gible investments, the effective cost of a dollar of intangible capital is only (1− κ), where κ
is the marginal tax rate. When available, we use simulated marginal tax rates from Graham
(1996). Otherwise, we assume a marginal tax rate of 30%, which is close to the mean tax
rate in the sample. The correlation between ctot and c∗ is 0.77.
2.3.5. Summary statistics
Table ?? contains summary statistics. We define intangible intensity as a firm’s ratio of
intangible to total capital, at replacement cost. The mean (median) intangible intensity
is 43% (45%), so almost half of capital is intangible in our typical firm-year. Knowledge
capital makes up only 24% of intangible capital on average, so organization capital makes
up 76%. The median firm has almost no knowledge capital, as almost half of firms report no
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Statistics are based on the sample of Compustat firms from 1975 to 2011. The physical capital stock,
Kphy, is measured as property, plant, and equipment (PP&E). We estimate the intangible capital stock,
Kint, by applying the perpetual inventory method to firms’ intangible investments, defined as research and
development (R&D) and 0.3 × selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) spending. We then add in firms’
balance sheet intangibles. Intangible intensity equals Kint/(Kint + Kphy). Knowledge capital is the part
of intangible capital that comes from R&D. The denominator for all new measures is Kint + Kphy. The
denominator for all standard measures is Kphy. The numerator for both q variables is the market value
of equity plus the book value of debt minus current assets. The numerator for ιphy is capital expenditure
(CAPX), and the numerator for ιint is R&D + (0.3 × SG&A). Total investment ιtot = ιphy + ιint. The
numerator for standard cash flow is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expenses. The
numerator for total cash flow is the same but adds back intangible investment net a tax adjustment.
Variable Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Skewness
Intangible capital stock (millions of dollars) 427 41.7 1990 11.6
Physical capital stock (millions of dollars) 1237 77.9 6691 16.5
Intangible intensity 0.43 0.45 0.27 -0.01
Knowledge capital / intangible capital 0.24 0.01 0.37 1.65
New measures
Total q (qtot) 1.11 0.57 1.91 3.76
Physical investment (ιphy) 0.10 0.06 0.14 3.47
Intangible investment (ιint) 0.11 0.09 0.11 1.92
Total investment (ιtot) 0.21 0.16 0.18 2.61
Total cash flow (ctot) 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.52
Standard measures
Standard q (q∗) 3.14 0.93 7.22 4.41
CAPX/PPE (ι∗) 0.19 0.11 0.24 3.52
Standard cash flow (c∗) 0.15 0.16 0.62 -1.63
R&D. The average qtot is mechanically smaller than q∗, because its denominator is larger.
The gap is dramatic in some cases. For example, Google’s q∗ is 10.1 in 2013, but its qtot
is only 3.2. Researchers sometimes discard q observations exceeding 10, arguing they are
unrealistically large. Total q exceeds 10 in only 1% of observations, compared with 7% for
standard q, suggesting total q is a more reliable measure. The standard deviation of qtot
is 74% lower than for q∗. The standard deviation scaled by its mean is also lower. The
average physical and intangible investment rates are roughly equal, but physical investment
is more volatile and right-skewed.
Fig. 1 shows that the average intangible intensity has increased over time, especially in the
1990s. The figure also shows that high-tech and health firms are heavy users of intangible
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Figure 7: Capital intangibility over time
Year
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 in
te
ns
ity
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7 All
Consumer
Manufacturing
High-tech
Health care
This figure plots the mean intangible capital intensity over time, both for our full sample
and within industries. Intangible intensity equals Kint/(Kint + Kphy), the firm’s stock of
intangible divided by its total stock of capital. We use the Fama and French five-industry
definition and exclude industry “Other.”
capital and that manufacturing firms use less. Somewhat surprisingly, even manufacturing
firms’ capital is 30–34% intangible on average.
2.4. Full-sample results
In this section, we test the theory’s predictions in our full sample. Section 5 compares results
across subsamples. We begin with the classic OLS panel regressions of Fazarri, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988). We then correct for measurement error bias in Subsection 2.4.2.
2.4.1. OLS results and co-movement in investment
Table 12 contains results from OLS regressions of investment on lagged q and firm and year
fixed effects. The columns compare different investment measures. For now, we focus on
R2 values, because the regression coefficients suffer from measurement error bias. This bias
is especially severe for cash flow coefficients (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Abel, 2014), so
we exclude cash flow until Subsection 4.2.
Taken literally, the theory predicts an R2 of 100% in Panel A when we measure investment
as ιphy, ιint, or ιtot. We find R2 values that are well below 100%. One potential explanation
is that we measure q with error, an issue we address in Subsection 4.2. Another is that
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Table 12: Ordinary least squares results
Results are from OLS panel regressions of investment on lagged Tobin’s q and firm and year fixed effects.
Each column uses a different investment measure. Physical investment (ιphy) equals capital expenditure
(CAPX) scaled by total capital (Ktot = Kphy + Kint). Intangible investment (ιint) equals research
and development (R&D) + 0.3 × selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expense, scaled by Ktot.
Total investment equals ιphy + ιint. R&D investment equals R&D scaled by total capital. The R&D
column excludes observations with missing R&D. The investment measure in the final column is CAPX
divided by property, plant and equipment (PP&E). Panel A shows regressions on total q, denoted qtot.
Panel B shows regressions on standard q, denoted q∗. The numerator for both q variables is the market
value of equity plus the book value of debt minus current assets. The denominator for qtot is Ktot.
The denominator for q∗ is Kphy. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. We report the
within-firm R2. Panel C tests whether the R2 values in Panels A and B are different, taking into account
the correlation across regressions and again clustering by firm. Data are from Compustat from 1975 to 2011.
Investment scaled by total capital (Ktot)
Physical (ιphy) Intangible (ιint) Total (ιtot) R&D CAPX/PPE (ι∗)
Panel A: Regressions with total q
Total q 0.029 0.020 0.049 0.013 0.062
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
R2 0.209 0.279 0.327 0.270 0.244
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Panel B: Regressions with standard q
Standard q 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.139 0.266 0.250 0.250 0.233
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Panel C: Difference in R2 (Panel A − Panel B)
∆R2 0.070 0.013 0.077 0.020 0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Number of observations 141,800 141,800 141,800 75,426 141,800
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slopes vary across firms or that shocks hit firms’ marginal adjustment cost functions. Our
theory’s prediction holds better for intangible investment (R2 = 27.9%) than for physical
investment (R2 = 20.9%), and it holds better still for total investment (R2 = 32.7%). We
also check that this result holds for the portion of intangible investment coming from R&D,
because the portion from SG&A is measured with more error. When we measure investment
as R&D scaled by total capital, we find an R2 of 27.0%, which is similar to the 27.9% R2
from our main intangible investment measure, ιint.
Our theory predicts a lower R2 for the literature’s usual regression of CAPX/PPE on
standard q, shown in the last column of Panel B. The R2 here is low (23.3%) relative to
all the R2 values in Panel A, with one exception: Standard q explains standard investment
slightly better than total q explains our new physical investment measure, ιphy. For ιphy,
measurement error in intangible capital could be offsetting any improvements from including
intangible capital in the denominator of q.
One interesting implication of our theory is that physical and intangible investment should
co-move strongly within firms, because the two capital types have the same marginal pro-
ductivity and, hence, the same marginal q. We find strong co-movement in the data: ιphy
and ιint have a 31% correlation after we remove firm and time fixed effects from both. Ac-
cording to the theory, this co-movement should decrease if we remove the effects of total
q, for example, by isolating the residuals for ιphy and ιint from Panel A. The correlation
between these two regressions’ residuals is lower (17%), consistent with the theory. This
remaining correlation could just be an artifact of measurement error in total q.
Throughout the corporate finance literature, researchers use Tobin’s q to proxy for firms’
investment opportunities. The R2 values in Table 2 help us judge how well these proxies
work and, in particular, whether total q or the literature’s standard q measure is the better
proxy for investment opportunities. Panel B shows how well standard q explains the five
investment measures, and Panel C tests whether total q or standard q delivers a higher R2.7
7Throughout, we conduct inference on R2 values using influence functions (Newey and McFadden, 1994).
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For all five investment measures, total q delivers a larger R2 value than standard q. The
improvement in R2 ranges from 1 to 8 percentage points, or from 5% to 50%. Some of the
improvements are modest in magnitude, but statistical significance in Panel C is high, with
t-statistics ranging from 3.4 to 25.
It is tempting to run a horse race by including total and standard q in the same regression.
Because both variables proxy for q with error, their resulting slopes would be biased in an
unknown direction, making the results difficult to interpret (Klepper and Leamer, 1984).
For this reason, we do not tabulate results from such a horse race. We simply note that
regressing either ιphy or ιtot on both q proxies produces a positive and highly significant
slope on qtot but a negative and less significant slope on q∗. For ιint and ι∗, both q variables
have a significantly positive slope, but the slope on qtot is much larger in magnitude.
Outside the investment literature, it is popular to measure Tobin’s q as the firm’s market
value scaled by its book value of assets. Like Erickson and Whited (2006, 2012), we find that
these market-to-book–assets ratios are especially poor proxies for investment opportunities.
They produce lower R2 values than both standard and total q no matter how we measure
investment (Online Appendix, Table A1).
To summarize, total q explains intangible investment slightly better than physical invest-
ment in our full sample, and it explains total investment even better. As our theory predicts,
physical and intangible investment co-move strongly within firms, because they share the
same q. This result suggests strong co-movement between physical and intangible capital’s
marginal productivities. Judging by these results, the neoclassical theory of investment is
just as relevant for intangible capital as it is for physical capital. We also show that total
q is a superior proxy for investment opportunities no matter how investment is measured.
In a regression y = βx + , this approach takes into account the estimation error in β, var(y), and var(x).
We cluster by firm, which accounts for autocorrelation both within and across regressions.
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2.4.2. Bias-corrected results
According to our theory, total q is better than standard q at approximating the true,
unobservable q. We recognize, however, that total q is still a noisy proxy. For one, we
measure intangible capital with error. Also, Tobin’s q measures average q, but investment
depends on marginal q in theory. Average q equals marginal q in our simple theory, but, to
the extent that reality departs from this theory, average q measures marginal q with error.8
Because we have only a proxy for q, all the OLS slopes from Subsection 4.1 suffer from
measurement error bias. We now estimate the previous models while correcting this bias
using the Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014) higher-order cumulant estimator.9 The cumu-
lant estimator provides unbiased estimates of β in the following classical errors-in-variables
model:
ιit = ai + qitβ + zitα+ uit (2.16)
pit = γ + qit + εit, (2.17)
where p is a noisy proxy for the true, unobservable q and z is a vector of perfectly measured
control variables. The cumulant estimator’s main identifying assumptions are that p has
nonzero skewness, β 6= 0, and u and ε are independent of q, z, and each other.
Because the cumulant estimator corrects for measurement error, why is a new q proxy with
less measurement error needed? The reason is that, by ignoring intangibles, the literature’s
standard physical investment and q proxies, ι∗ and q∗, are both mismeasured, and the mea-
surement error is multiplicative, not additive. The measurement error in ι∗ and q∗ comes
8Gala (2014) measures the differences between marginal and average q.
9The cumulant estimator supersedes the Erickson and Whited (2002) higher-order moment estimator.
Cumulants are polynomials of moments. The estimator is a generalized method of moments (GMM) esti-
mator with moments equal to higher-order cumulants of investment and q. Compared with the Erickson
and Whited (2002) estimator, the cumulant estimator has better finite-sample properties and a closed-form
solution, which makes numerical implementation easier and more reliable. We use the third-order cumulant
estimator, which dominates the fourth-order estimator in the estimation of τ2 (Erickson and Whited, 2012;
Erickson, Jiang, and Whited, 2014). Results are similar using the fourth-order cumulant estimator (Online
Appendix).
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from the omission of intangibles. Because that same error is in both variables, their measure-
ment errors are correlated with each other, violating the cumulant estimator’s assumption
that u and ε are independent.10 The measurement error is multiplicative, because changing
the variables’ denominators from physical to total capital requires multiplying them both
by Kphy/Ktot. The multiplicative error makes both variables’ errors depend on the true
q, violating the cumulant estimator’s assumption that u and ε are independent of q. We
cannot solve the problem by regressing total investment on the standard q measure (ιtot
on q∗), because measurement error in q∗ is still multiplicative and, hence, a function of q,
again violating the cumulant estimator’s assumption that ε is independent of q.11
We perform a simple horse race to illustrate that the cumulant estimator on its own cannot
correct for the measurement error in the standard q measure. Using the cumulant estimator,
we regress ιtot on q∗, and then regress ιtot on qtot. If the cumulant estimator could correct
for the measurement error in q∗, then the two q proxies should produce similar q-slope
estimates and ρ2 values (defined below). Instead, we find that using total q produces a
significantly higher q-slope (0.086 versus 0.023) and higher ρ2 (0.423 versus 0.314). Results
are in the Online Appendix.
Estimation results are in Table 13. Regarding the slopes on q, our estimates imply that
intangible capital’s convex adjustment costs are roughly twice as large as those for physical
capital. According to our theory, the q-slopes measure the inverse capital adjustment-
cost parameters γphy and γint. In Panel A, the 0.070 slope for ιphy is roughly double
the 0.037 slope for ιint. We obtain a similar result after controlling for cash flow (Panel
B) and also if we isolate the R&D component of intangible investment (Column 4). As
we explain in Subsection 2.2, an important caveat is that our regressions can identify the
10To see this, assume that the world behaves according to ιtotit = qitβ˜, where qit is the unobservable, true
q; that our empirical proxy qtotit = qit + ε˜it, where ε˜it is independently distributed; and that we mistakenly
estimate the errors-in-variables model using the standard measures: ι∗it = qitβ + uit and q
∗
it = qit + εit.
One can prove that uit = qit
(
AitBitβ˜ − β
)
and εit = qit (Bit − 1) + Bitε˜it, where Bit = Ktotit /Kphyit and
Ait = I
phy
it /I
tot
it . Because uit and εit both depend on qitBit, they are not independent of q or each other.
11To see this, suppose that the assumptions in footnote 10 hold, except we instead estimate the errors-in-
variables model ιtotit = qitβ + uit, and q
∗
it = qit + εit. One can prove that εit = qit (Bit − 1) + ε˜itBit, so εit
and qit are not independent of each other.
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convex component but not the overall level of adjustment costs.
This result helps support the Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009, p. 160) conjecture
that “R&D likely has high adjustment costs ..., possibly substantially higher than the
adjustment costs for physical investment.” Their argument is that R&D involves spending
on highly skilled technology workers who are costly to hire, train, and replace. Hall (2002),
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Griliches and Hausman (1986), and Grabowski (1968)
make similar arguments about R&D, and one could make similar arguments about human
capital investments that are part of SG&A. Empirical evidence supporting these arguments
is currently very limited.12 An important implication of our result is that firms adjust more
slowly to shocks to their investment opportunities as the economy shifts toward intangible
capital.
Table 13 also changes how we view physical capital’s adjustment costs. The last column
in Panel A shows the literature’s standard regression, which omits intangible capital. Pre-
diction 4 in our theory states that this regression delivers a downward-biased estimate
of 1/γphy, i.e., a downward-biased q-slope. Consistent with this prediction, this standard
regression delivers a q-slope of 0.036, roughly half as large as the 0.070 slope from the regres-
sion using ιphy and scaling q by total capital. As we explain in Subsection 2.1, the typical
regression delivers downward-biased slopes because the ratio of physical to total capital
is an omitted variable that it positively related to the regressor and negatively related to
the residual. This result helps resolve a puzzle in the investment literature. Researchers
since Summers (1981) have argued that investment-q regressions produce implausibly small
q-slopes, i.e., large adjustment costs. We find that physical capital’s q-slopes are twice as
large as previously believed, once one accounts for intangible capital.
12Bernstein and Nadiri (1989a, 1989b) and Mohnen, Nadiri, and Prucha (1986) report slower adjustment
speeds for R&D capital than physical capital in most but not all industries and for most but not all of their
adjustment-cost measures. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989a, 1989b) use data on 48 firms from 1965 to 1978 and
35 firms from 1959 to 1966, respectively. Mohnen, Nadiri, and Prucha (1986) use three countries’ aggregate
data from 1965 to 1977. Intangible capital was less prevalent during these years, and US firms were not
required to report R&D until 1975. Li, Liu, and Xue (2014) estimate a structural model off the cross section
of stock returns, and they find larger adjustment costs for R&D capital. By focusing on R&D capital, all
these papers exclude organization capital.
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Table 13: Bias-corrected results
Results are from regressions of investment on lagged Tobin’s q, firm fixed effects, and (in Panel B) contem-
poraneous cash flow, all estimated using the cumulant estimator. Each column uses a different investment
measure as defined in Table 12. Total (standard) q equals the firm’s market value scaled by Ktot (Kphy).
The numerator for standard cash flow is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expenses. The
numerator for total cash flow is the same but adds back intangible investment net a tax adjustment. Total
cash flow is scaled by Ktot; standard cash flow, by Kphy. ρ2 is the within-firm R2 from a hypothetical
regression of investment on true q, and τ2 is the within-firm R2 from a hypothetical regression of our q
proxy on true q. For comparison, the table also shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) R2 values from
Table 12. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Data are from Compustat from 1975 to 2011.
Investment scaled by total capital (Ktot)
Physical (ιphy) Intangible (ιint) Total (ιtot) R&D CAPX/PPE (ι∗)
Panel A: Regressions without cash flow
Total q (qtot) 0.070 0.037 0.086 0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Standard q (q∗) 0.036
(0.001)
OLS R2 0.209 0.279 0.327 0.270 0.233
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
ρ2 0.358 0.392 0.423 0.376 0.372
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
τ2 0.437 0.559 0.597 0.593 0.492
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
Panel B: Regressions with cash flow
Total q (qtot) 0.069 0.038 0.086 0.024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Total cash flow (ctot) 0.024 0.050 0.140 0.000
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Standard q (q∗) 0.035
(0.001)
Standard cash flow (c∗) 0.015
(0.004)
OLS R2 0.235 0.326 0.374 0.281 0.233
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
ρ2 0.361 0.447 0.481 0.405 0.371
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
τ2 0.435 0.502 0.544 0.568 0.494
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
Number of observations 141,800 141,800 141,800 75,426 141,800
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In addition to delivering unbiased q-slopes, the cumulant estimator produces two useful
test statistics. The first, ρ2, is the hypothetical R2 from Eq. (2.16). Loosely speaking, ρ2
indicates how well the true, unobservable q explains investment, with ρ2 = 1 implying a
perfect relation. Taken literally, our theory predicts ρ2 = 1 even if we measure q with error.
The second statistic, τ2, is the hypothetical R2 from Eq. (2.17). It indicates how well our
q proxy explains true q, with τ2 = 1 implying a perfect proxy.
Comparing the total-investment regression with the literature’s typical regression, we find
that including intangible capital produces a stronger investment-q relation (ρ2 of 0.423
versus 0.372, a 14% increase) and a better proxy for Tobin’s q (τ2 of 0.597 versus 0.492,
a 21% increase). On these dimensions, the classic q-theory fits the data better when we
account for intangible capital. Model fit is still far from perfect, though: q explains less
than half the variation in investment, and our total-q proxy explains less than 60% of the
variation in true q.
Finally, we discuss the cash flow slopes shown in Panel B. Our simple theory predicts a zero
cash flow slope for regressions using ιphy, ιint, and ιtot. We find that physical investment
has a significantly positive cash flow slope, contrary to the theory’s prediction. We also find
that including intangible capital affects the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow.
The physical investment–cash flow sensitivity is 60% higher (0.024 versus 0.015) when we
compare the specification with ιphy with the standard regression using CAPX/PPE.
Compared with physical investment, intangible investment appears roughly twice as sen-
sitive to cash flow (slope of 0.050 versus 0.024). Intangible investment is the sum of its
R&D and SG&A components. Which component is most important for producing the high
investment–cash flow sensitivity? Column 4 of Panel B shows that R&D investment has a
slope of zero on cash flow, consistent with the theory’s prediction. SG&A investment must
be highly sensitive to cash flow. Indeed, we find that SG&A investment has a cash flow
slope of 0.115, which is more than double intangible investment’s slope of 0.050 (Online
Appendix).
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One concern here is that measurement error in SG&A investment is biasing its cash flow
slope upward. Compared with R&D, we measure SG&A investment with considerable error.
Our ctot measure is gross of SG&A investment, meaning we add back SG&A investment
when computing it [Eq. (2.15)]. Any measurement error in SG&A investment, therefore,
appears mechanically in both ctot and SG&A investment itself, biasing its cash flow slope
upward. For this reason, we view 0.115 as an upper bound for SG&A investment’s cash
flow sensitivity. We provide a lower bound in the Online Appendix by creating an alternate
cash flow measure that is net of SG&A and, therefore, immune from this concern. SG&A
investment has a statistically insignificant slope of 0.008 on this alternate cash flow measure.
This 0.008 slope provides a lower bound for the true slope, because netting SG&A from cash
flow pushes down the cash flow slope, and an economically meaningful cash flow measure
should be gross of all investment, including SG&A investment. In sum, we can provide
only a wide range for SG&A investment’s cash flow slope (0.008–0.115), which implies a
wide range in intangible investment’s cash flow slope (0.012–0.050). Whether physical or
intangible investment is more sensitive to cash flow is unclear.
Even absent these measurement challenges, interpreting the investment–cash flow sensitivity
is notoriously difficult. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) interpret it as evidence of
financing constraints. In contrast, theories by Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cooper and
Ejarque (2003), Hennessy and Whited (2007), Abel and Eberly (2011), and Gourio and
Rudanko (2014) predict an investment–cash flow sensitivity even in the absence of financing
constraints. For example, decreasing returns to scale can make cash flow informative about
marginal q, even after controlling for Tobin’s (average) q. We simply conclude that physical
investment is even more sensitive to cash flow than previously believed, R&D investment
is insensitive to cash flow, and SG&A investment’s cash flow sensitivity remains unclear.
Without performing a full structural estimation, it is difficult to tell whether these cash
flow results are driven by financing constraints, diseconomies of scale, or some other source.
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2.5. Comparing subsamples
Next, we compare results across firms, industries, and years. Doing so allows us to test
our theory and compare adjustment costs across subsamples. It also lets us check our main
results’ robustness across subsamples, which we discuss in Section 2.7.
We reestimate the previous models in subsamples formed using three variables. First,
we sort firms each year into quartiles based on their lagged intangible intensity (Table 14).
Second, we use the Fama and French five-industry definition to compare the manufacturing,
consumer, high-tech, and health industries (Table 15). Third, we compare the early (1972–
1995) and late (1996–2011) parts of our sample (Table 16). For each subsample, we estimate
regressions using ιphy, ιint, and ιtot, as well as the standard regression with CAPX/PPE.
2.5.1. Testing the theory in subsamples
The classic q theory, including the theory in this paper, fits the data better in settings with
more intangible capital. We find this improved fit on three dimensions.
First, R2 values increase dramatically when moving from the lowest to highest intangi-
ble quartile (Table 14, Panel B). For example, the R2 for the total-investment regression
increases monotonically from 23% to 47%. Even when we use the literature’s standard in-
vestment and q measures, the R2 increase monotonically from 18% to 30%. This last result
is surprising, because the standard q measure has more measurement error in firms with
more intangibles: τ2 is 44% in Quartile 4 versus 68% in Quartile 1. The patterns are similar
when we compare manufacturing with high-intangible industries or the early with the late
subperiod. The increases in R2 across subsamples, tabulated in the last columns of Tables
14–16, are statistically significant for all four investment measures and in all three tables,
with just two exceptions out of 12 (Table 15, Specification 1 and Table 16, Specification 1).
Second, ρ2 values increase monotonically and roughly double when moving from the lowest
to highest intangible quartile (Panel C). This result means that the true q’s explanatory
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Table 14: Comparing firms with different amounts of intangible capital
This table shows results from subsamples formed based on yearly quartiles of intangible intensity, which
equals the ratio of a firm’s intangible to total capital. The first row show each quartile’s mean intangible
intensity. Results are from regressions of investment on lagged q, firm fixed effects, and (in Panel E) contem-
poraneous cash flow. Slopes on q and cash flow, as well as ρ2 and τ2 values, are from the cumulant estimator.
R2 is from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator that includes year fixed effects. Specifications 1–3
use physical (ιphy), intangible (ιint), and total investment (ιtot), respectively, along with total q, all of which
are scaled by total capital. Specification 4 uses standard investment (ι∗ = capital expenditure (CAPX) /
property plant and equipment (PPE)) and standard q (q∗), which is scaled by physical capital. The last
row in Panel A shows the ratio of the Specification 2 q-slope to the sum of slopes from Specifications 1 and
2. We conduct inference using the delta method. Specifications 5–8 in Panel E add standard cash flow (c∗)
and total cash flow (ctot), defined in Table 13. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. We use
influence functions to conduct inference for ρ2 and τ2.
Quartile 4 − 1
Specification Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Difference
Standard
error
Intangible intensity 8% 33% 56% 76%
Panel A: Slopes on q
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.095 0.081 0.063 0.050 -0.045 (0.004)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.027 0.032 0.035 0.038 0.011 (0.004)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.101 0.097 0.086 0.074 -0.027 (0.004)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.065 0.052 0.035 0.033 -0.032 (0.007)
βint/(βint + βphy) 22% 28% 36% 43% 21% (2.90%)
Panel B: OLS R2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.219 0.227 0.259 0.284 0.065 (0.026)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.061 0.170 0.306 0.458 0.397 (0.064)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.232 0.270 0.357 0.473 0.241 (0.016)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.182 0.195 0.248 0.299 0.117 (0.022)
Panel C: ρ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.261 0.364 0.486 0.612 0.351 (0.027)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.271 0.311 0.377 0.411 0.140 (0.048)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.274 0.388 0.498 0.543 0.269 (0.020)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.197 0.282 0.379 0.561 0.364 (0.023)
Panel D: τ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.650 0.478 0.374 0.375 -0.275 (0.033)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.196 0.365 0.561 0.792 0.596 (0.031)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.664 0.519 0.503 0.659 -0.005 (0.034)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.682 0.514 0.483 0.439 -0.243 (0.062)
Panel E: Slopes on cash flow
(5) ιphy on qtot, ctot 0.203 0.090 -0.009 -0.036 -0.239 (0.023)
(6) ιint on qtot, ctot -0.018 0.018 0.060 0.110 0.128 (0.013)
(7) ιtot on qtot, ctot 0.227 0.148 0.100 0.129 -0.098 (0.024)
(8) CAPX/PPE on q∗, c∗ 0.182 0.072 0.011 -0.003 -0.185 (0.026)
Number of observations 35,438 35,453 35,442 35,467
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Table 15: Comparing industries
This table shows results from industry subsamples. We use the Fama and French five-industry definition,
excluding the industry “Other.” Remaining details are the same as in Table 14.
Quartile 4 − 1
Specification Manufacturing Consumer High-tech Health Difference
Standard
error
Intangible intensity 31% 48% 55% 62%
Panel A: Slopes on q
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.083 0.085 0.059 0.068 -0.015 (0.005)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.040 0.002 (0.003)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.097 0.102 0.079 0.084 -0.013 (0.005)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.041 0.042 0.033 0.038 -0.003 (0.003)
Panel B: OLS R2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.194 0.239 0.307 0.244 0.050 (0.038)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.206 0.209 0.407 0.281 0.075 (0.031)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.258 0.310 0.460 0.362 0.104 (0.024)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.186 0.214 0.354 0.258 0.072 (0.031)
Panel C: ρ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.254 0.397 0.540 0.551 0.297 (0.036)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.321 0.234 0.474 0.376 0.055 (0.030)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.294 0.386 0.572 0.521 0.227 (0.028)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.206 0.290 0.549 0.545 0.339 (0.029)
Panel D: τ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.557 0.442 0.431 0.319 -0.238 (0.035)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.398 0.485 0.686 0.545 0.147 (0.041)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.632 0.539 0.634 0.522 -0.110 (0.036)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.655 0.539 0.511 0.365 -0.290 (0.048)
Panel E: Slopes on cash flow
(5) ιphy on qtot, ctot 0.171 0.029 -0.033 -0.059 -0.230 (0.032)
(6) ιint on qtot, ctot 0.041 0.106 0.059 -0.019 -0.060 (0.017)
(7) ιtot on qtot, ctot 0.265 0.190 0.090 0.010 -0.255 (0.034)
(8) CAPX/PPE on q∗, c∗ 0.083 0.048 0.001 -0.003 -0.086 (0.018)
Number of observations 40,280 36,884 31,680 11,207
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Table 16: Comparing time periods
This table shows results from the early (1975–1995) and late (1996–2011) subsamples.
The 1995 breakpoint produces subsamples of roughly equal size. Remaining details are the
same as in Table 14.
Late − Early
Specification Early Late Difference
Standard
error
Intangible intensity 39% 47%
Panel A: Slopes on q
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.083 0.062 -0.021 (0.002)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.035 0.037 0.002 (0.002)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.100 0.079 -0.021 (0.004)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.043 0.033 -0.010 (0.001)
Panel B: OLS R2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.205 0.208 0.003 (0.018)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.190 0.328 0.138 (0.016)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.273 0.357 0.084 (0.013)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.209 0.268 0.059 (0.017)
Panel C: ρ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.304 0.407 0.103 (0.016)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.259 0.497 0.238 (0.018)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.336 0.511 0.175 (0.016)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.262 0.479 0.217 (0.016)
Panel D: τ2 values
(1) ιphy on qtot 0.501 0.423 -0.078 (0.022)
(2) ιint on qtot 0.504 0.584 0.080 (0.030)
(3) ιtot on qtot 0.595 0.603 0.008 (0.022)
(4) CAPX/PPE on q∗ 0.615 0.477 -0.138 (0.026)
Panel E: Slopes on cash flow
(5) ιphy on qtot, ctot 0.109 -0.033 -0.142 (0.017)
(6) ιint on qtot, ctot 0.090 -0.033 -0.123 (0.013)
(7) ιtot on qtot, ctot 0.256 0.038 -0.218 (0.020)
(8) CAPX/PPE on q∗, c∗ 0.074 -0.008 -0.082 (0.009)
Number of observations 69,753 72,047
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power for investment is much stronger in firms with more intangible capital. This increase
in ρ2 is responsible for the large increases in R2 across subsamples. Again, the patterns are
similar across industries and years.
Third, cash flow slopes are significantly lower in firms, industries, and years with more
intangible capital (Panel E). The cash flow slopes even turn slightly negative in several high-
intangible subsamples, even when we use the literature’s standard measures. This result
is robust across all four investment measures and across Tables 14–16, with one exception:
Intangible investment has a larger cash flow slope in higher-intangible quartiles (Table 14).
This exception could be an artifact of the measurement error bias we discuss in Subsection
4.2. Like us, Chen and Chen (2012) find a weaker investment-cash flow sensitivity in recent
years. Our findings suggest this change over time could partially reflect the rise of intangible
capital.
The rest of this subsection seeks to explain why the classic q theory works better in settings
with more intangibles. Put differently, which of the theory’s assumptions are violated
more severely in firms using less intangibles? We start by exploring theoretically whether
violations of our simple model’s assumptions could explain the patterns in Table 14. We
solve a more general model that relaxes our earlier assumptions about constant returns to
scale, perfect competition, and quadratic adjustment costs. Details and numerical results
are in the Online Appendix. We explain two predictions from the model next.
We find that violating the assumption about quadratic adjustment costs is unlikely to
generate the empirical patterns in Table 14. When we change the adjustment-cost function’s
exponent from 2 to 1.75 or 1.5, we find a negligible effect on predicted R2 values, and we
do not find a significant predicted investment–cash flow relation.
Differences in economies of scale or competition could theoretically explain some of the pat-
terns in Table 14. Relative to the benchmark theory in Section 2, a theory with imperfect
competition or decreasing returns to scale produces lower predicted R2 values in regressions
87
of investment on q, and it also generates a positive investment–cash flow relation, a pre-
diction already known from Abel and Eberly (2011). If firms using more intangible capital
are closer to the perfect-competition, constant-returns benchmark, this mechanism could
explain why they exhibit lower cash flow slopes and higher R2 and ρ2 values.
Unfortunately, we find little empirical support for this mechanism. In the Online Appendix,
we check whether firms with more intangibles are closer to the perfect-competition, constant-
returns benchmark. First, we estimate production-function curvature using the methods
of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Olley and Pakes (1996). Comparing the curvature
estimates across subsamples, we find no statistically significant differences in economies of
scale between the high- and low-intangible quartiles. Also, whereas the improvement in
model fit in Table 14 is monotonic across quartiles, the curvature estimates are strongly
non-monotonic. Second, we compare three competition proxies across subsamples. We
find mixed results when we use the Herfindahl Index to proxy for industry-level competi-
tion; different industry classifications deliver increasing, decreasing, or flat patterns across
intangible-intensity subsamples. We also compare profitability across subsamples, because
competition should reduce profitability. Again, different profitability measures produce op-
posing results. We also compare firm size across subsamples, as relatively small firms within
an industry can face more competition. The relation between firm size and intangible usage
is either statistically insignificant or strongly non-monotonic depending on the size proxy
we use. To summarize, we do not find any robust empirical evidence that high-intangible
firms face less diseconomies of scale or more competition.
One last possible explanation for the pattern in Table 14 is that high-intangible firms
are less financially constrained, making the theory fit the data better. This explanation
seems unlikely, because it is difficult to use intangible assets as collateral, which arguably
makes high-intangible firms more financially constrained (Almeida and Campello, 2007;
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim, 2013). Unfortunately, it is difficult to test this financing-
constraints mechanism without a full structural estimation (Hennessy and Whited, 2007).
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2.5.2. Comparing adjustment costs across subsamples
Table 14 shows interesting patterns in q-slopes across subsamples. According to our theory,
these q-slopes do not help us test our theory’s predictions or assumptions. Instead, the
q-slopes reflect adjustment-cost parameters.
Table 14 shows that firms using more intangibles have significantly smaller slopes of physical
investment on q, and they have significantly larger slopes of intangible investment on q. The
implications are that firms using more intangibles have physical capital that exhibits larger
convex adjustment costs and that they have intangible capital that exhibits smaller convex
adjustment costs.
This pattern in q-slopes points to differences in the nature of physical and intangible capital
across firms, and it could also shed light on why some firms use more intangible capital.
As we explain at the end of Subsection 2.1, if a firm’s intangible capital is less costly than
physical capital to adjust, then the firm is predicted to use relatively more intangible capital.
As a result, firms using more intangible capital should have a higher intangible investment
q-slope relative to the sum of slopes for physical and intangible investment. We show these
slope ratios in Panel A of Table 14. The ratios increase monotonically across the quartiles,
consistent with our theory. Our theory further predicts that the slope ratio equals firms’
intangible intensity. The actual intensities, shown in the column labels, range from 8%
to 76%, and the slope ratios ranges from only 22% to 43%. Our simple theory, therefore,
explains part but not all of firms’ different intangible-capital usage.
This exercise provides a useful consistency check on our theory. Some important caveats are
in order, though. To link q-slopes to firms’ optimal mix of capital types, our theory needs
strong additional assumptions. The theory requires that physical and intangible capital are
identical in all ways except for their quadratic adjustment-cost parameters. Outside our
simple theory, alternate explanations could exist for the pattern we find in q-slopes across
firms. We know from the investment-q literature that q-slopes need not reflect adjustment
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costs. For example, Abel and Eberly (2011) show that, even in a world with no adjustment
costs, diseconomies of scale can make investment and Tobin’s q positively related. Also,
differences could exist between physical and intangible capital’s purchase prices, depreci-
ation rates, economies of scale, and adjustment-cost curvatures. These differences could
affect both firms’ optimal mix of capitals and their investment-q slopes. Because Table 14
does not control for these differences, we might just be picking up these omitted differences
between physical and intangible capital.
To explore this potential bias further, we solve a more general model that allows physical and
intangible capital to differ in ways not allowed in Section 2. We assume that physical and
intangible capital share the same adjustment-cost parameters (γphy = γint), so we shut down
the mechanism proposed above. We then ask whether other differences between physical
and intangible capital could produce predicted q-slope patterns like the ones in Table 14.
Details and numerical results are in the Online Appendix. First, we find that differences in
purchase prices (pphyit 6= pintit ) can explain why some firms use more intangible capital, but
they do not explain why firms have different investment-q slopes. Second, we show that
differences between the two capital types’ economies of scale do not necessarily drive them
to use more of one capital type and do not make their q-slopes differ significantly. These
first two alternate explanations—differences in purchase prices or economies of scale—do
not seem to work for the empirical patterns we find. Third, we show that if intangible
capital depreciates faster than physical capital, then firms optimally use less intangibles
and intangible investment has a slightly lower q-slope than physical investment, consistent
with the patterns in Table 14. Finally, we relax the assumption that both capital types face
quadratic adjustment costs. We show that if intangible capital faces less-convex adjustment
costs than physical capital, then firms optimally use less intangible capital and intangible
investment has a lower q-slope than physical investment, consistent again with the patterns
in Table 14. We cannot rule out that these last two mechanisms, differences in depreciation
rates or adjustment-cost convexities between the two capital types, are driving the Table
14 cross-sectional relation between q-slopes and capital mixes.
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2.6. Macro results
The neoclassical theory of investment, including the theory in this paper, can easily be
interpreted as a theory of the macroeconomy, not a single firm. The macro literature has
been interested in the investment-q relation going back to at least Abel (1980) and Summers
(1981). We ask how this relation changes when we account for intangible capital.
Our macro sample contains 141 quarterly observations for the US economy from 1972Q2 to
2007Q2, the longest period for which all variables are available. Data on aggregate physical
q and investment come from Hall (2001), who uses the flow of funds and aggregate stock and
bond market data. The literature’s standard q measure, again denoted q∗, is the ratio of the
value of ownership claims on the firm, less the book value of inventories, to the reproduction
cost of plant and equipment. The standard investment measure, again denoted ι∗, equals
private nonresidential fixed investment scaled by its corresponding stock, both of which are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Data on the aggregate stock and flow of physical and intangible capital come from Carol
Corrado and are discussed in Corrado and Hulten (2014). Earlier versions of these data are
used by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) and Corrado and Hulten (2010). Their measures
of intangible capital include aggregate spending on business investment in computerized
information (from NIPA), R&D (from the National Science Foundation and Census Bureau),
and economic competencies, which include investments in brand names, employer-provided
worker training, and other items. One advantage of these macro data relative to our firm-
level data is that the macro data do not rely on an assumption about the fraction of SG&A
representing an investment. As before, we measure the total capital stock as the sum of the
physical and intangible capital stocks. We compute total q as the ratio of total ownership
claims on firm value, less the book value of inventories, to the total capital stock. We define
the investment rates ιphy, ιint, and ιtot as in our firm-level analysis. To mitigate problems
from potentially differing data coverage, we use the Corrado and Hulten (2014) ratio of
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physical to total capital to adjust the Hall (2001) measures of physical q and investment.13
The correlation between standard and total q is extremely high, 0.997. The reason is that
total q equals standard q times the ratio of physical to total capital, and this ratio has
changed slowly and consistently over time (Fig. 1). Of more importance is the change
from standard to total investment, which additionally requires multiplying ι∗ by the ratio
of capital flows, which is much more volatile than the ratio of capital stocks. The correlation
between total and standard investment is therefore much smaller, 0.43.
For comparison, we also use the Philippon (2009) aggregate bond q measure, which he
obtains by applying a structural model to data on bond maturities and yields. Bond q is
available at the macro level but not at the firm level. Philippon (2009) shows that bond q
explains more of the aggregate variation in what we call physical investment than standard
q does. Bond q data are from Philippon’s website.
Fig. 2 plots the time series of investment and q. Panel A shows the standard q and
investment measures, which omit intangible capital. Except in a few subperiods, q explains
investment relatively poorly, as Philippon (2009) and others have shown. Panel B shows
that the relation between total q and ιphy is still weak. Panel C shows a strong relation
between total q and intangible investment, mainly because total q and intangible investment
both trend up from 1982 to 2000. Panel D compares total investment and total q. Here the
fit looks strongest of all.
To explore these patterns more carefully, Table 17 shows results from time series regres-
sions of investment on lagged q. Panel A shows regressions in levels, comparing our four
investment measures. Consistent with Fig. 2, the literature’s standard measures and ιphy
produce statistically insignificant q-slopes and R2 values near zero. In stark contrast, in-
tangible and total investment both have highly significant q-slopes, and they deliver R2
values of 57% and 61%, respectively. These R2 values are even higher than the 46% R2 that
13To be precise, we use the Hall (2001) data on q∗ and ι∗ and the Corrado and Hulten (2014) data on
A = Kphy/(Kphy +Kint) and B = Iphy/(Iphy + Iint). We compute qtot = q∗A, ιphy = ι∗A, ιtot = ιphy/B,
and ιint = ιtot − ιphy.
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Figure 8: Investment-q relation in macro data.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
To
bi
n'
s 
q
0
1
2
3
4
5
Panel A: Standard q, standard investment
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
1
2
3
4
Panel B: Total q, physical investment (ιphy)
In
ve
st
m
en
t
0.08
0.10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
To
bi
n'
s 
q
0
1
2
3
4
Panel C: Total q, intangible investment (ιint)
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Panel D: Total q, total investment (ιtot)
In
ve
st
m
en
t
0.15
0.20
This figure plots Tobin’s q (solid lines) and the investment rates (dashed lines) over time
for the aggregate US economy. Panel A uses data from Hall (2001) and shows standard
measures that exclude intangible capital. Standard q (q∗) is aggregate market value scaled
by the physical capital stock. Standard investment (ι∗) equals physical investment scaled by
the physical capital stock. Panels B–D also use data from Corrado and Hulten (2014). Total
q is aggregate market value scaled by total capital, the sum of the physical and intangible
capital stocks. Panel B shows ιphy, physical investment scaled by total capital. Panel C
shows ιint, intangible investment scaled by total capital. Panel D shows ιtot = ιphy + ιint.
For each graph, the left axis is the value of q and the right axis is the investment rate.
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Philippon (2009) obtains by regressing the standard investment measure on bond q (Panel
B). Judging by R2, the classic q theory fits the data much better when we include intangible
capital, because we are better able to explain the low-frequency trends in q and investment.
Put differently, the literature’s standard investment measure suffers from a low-frequency
error—the omission of intangibles—that trends strongly with q over time.
How well can q explain higher-frequency variation in investment? Panels C and D answer
this question by rerunning the previous regressions in four-quarter differences. As in our
firm-level analysis, total q now explains physical and intangible investment roughly equally
well, and it explains total investment even better. As before, intangible investment has a
lower q-slope than physical investment, indicating higher convex adjustment costs. Bond
q, though, is much better than total q at explaining changes in investment. In differences,
bond q also explains physical investment better than intangible investment. Philippon
(2009) offers one potential explanation: Growth options affect stocks more than bonds, and
growth options affect intangible investment more than physical investment. Put differently,
physical and intangible capital can have different values of marginal q. Bond q could be a
better proxy for physical capital’s marginal q, whereas the traditional q measures, which use
stock prices, could be better proxies for intangible capital’s marginal q. A second possible
explanation is about sample selection. Firms with more intangible investment typically hold
less debt, so they contribute less to the aggregate bond q measure.
To summarize, at the macro level, including intangibles makes q explain the level of invest-
ment much better, meaning the classic q theory fits the data much better than previously
believed. When we try to explain changes in investment, the macro results look more like
our firm-level results. Bond q is still better at explaining physical investment as well as
changes in investment.
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Table 17: Time series macro regressions
Results are from 141 quarterly observations from aggregate US data, from 1972Q2 to 2007Q2. Each column
uses a different investment measure. Standard q (q∗) equals the lagged aggregate stock and bond market
value divided by the physical capital stock. Hall (2001) computes these measures from the flow of funds.
Total q includes intangible capital by multiplying physical q by the ratio of physical to total capital. The
ratio is from the Corrado and Hulten (2014) aggregate US data. Bond q is constructed by applying the
structural model of Philippon (2009) to bond maturity and yield data. These data are from Philippon’s
website. Newey-West standard errors with autocorrelation up to 12 quarters are in parentheses. Standard
errors for the ordinary least squares (OLS) R2 values are computed via bootstrap.
Investment scaled by total capital (Ktot)
CAPX / PPE (ι∗) Physical (ιphy) Intangible (ιint) Total (ιtot)
Panel A: Regressions in levels
Total q (qtot) -0.001 0.019 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard q (q∗) 0.002
(0.003)
OLS R2 0.035 0.014 0.570 0.610
(0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.040)
Panel B: Regressions in levels with bond q
Bond q 0.061 0.049 0.006 0.055
(0.009) (0.011) (0.039) (0.032)
OLS R2 0.462 0.347 0.001 0.139
(0.059) (0.050) (0.013) (0.060)
Panel C: Regressions in four-quarter differences
Total q (qtot) 0.007 0.004 0.01
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Standard q (q∗) 0.007
(0.002)
OLS R2 0.124 0.106 0.096 0.121
(0.057) (0.052) (0.056) (0.060)
Panel D: Regressions in four-quarter differences with bond q
Bond q 0.056 0.043 0.017 0.060
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
OLS R2 0.606 0.620 0.235 0.530
(0.053) (0.059) (0.074) (0.070)
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2.7. Robustness
This section describes our results’ robustness across different subsamples, empirical mea-
sures, and estimators. We also explain why our main results are not mechanical.
2.7.1. Robustness of main results across subsamples
Tables 14–16 show that our main results are quite robust across subsamples. Compared
with physical investment, intangible investment has a lower q-slope in all ten subsamples
(Panel A). We always see larger q-slopes for physical investment in the specification with
ιphy compared with the specification with CAPX/PP&E (Panel A). Total q always explains
total investment better than it explains either physical or intangible investment and better
than standard q explains standard investment (Panel B). This result means that including
intangibles produces a better proxy for investment opportunities even in subsamples with
less intangible capital, such as the manufacturing industry. In the full sample (Table 13),
total q explains intangible investment slightly better than physical investment. We see
the reverse in four of ten subsamples, so we conclude that total q explains physical and
intangible investment roughly equally well.
The improvement in model fit from including intangible capital is especially large in sub-
samples with more intangible capital, which is a useful consistency check. Consider the
increase in R2 when moving from the regression that ignores intangibles (Specification 4
in the tables) to the regression that uses ιtot and qtot (Specification 3). In Table 14, the
increase in R2 is 0.174 (58%) in the highest intangible quartile, but just 0.050 (27%) in the
lowest quartile. This pattern is mainly driven by τ2, which increases by 0.284 (65%) in the
top quartile but decreases by a statistically insignificant 0.018 (3%) in the lowest quartile.
This result means that total q is a better proxy for true q, especially in firms with the most
intangible capital. These same patterns are also present, but less dramatic, across industry
and year subsamples.
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Table 18: Robustness: what fraction of SG&A expense is an investment?
Results are from regressions of three investment measures on lagged total q and firm fixed effects. Slopes on
total q are from the cumulant estimator. Within-firm R2 is from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
that also includes year fixed effects. The selling, general and administrative (SG&A) multiplier is the fraction
of SG&A assumed to represent an investment. Our main analysis uses a 0.3 multiplier. For each multiplier
value, we reestimate the intangible investment and capital stocks in the data. Because physical investment,
total investment, and total q are scaled by total capital, their values also depend on the SG&A multiplier.
Each regression uses 141,800 firm-year Compustat observations from 1975 to 2011. * indicates value used
in main analysis
Investment scaled by total capital (Ktot)
SG&A Physical (ιphy) Intangible (ιint) Total (ιtot)
Multiplier q-slope OLS R2 q-slope OLS R2 q-slope OLS R2
0.0 0.060 0.223 0.021 0.147 0.064 0.277
0.1 0.064 0.217 0.025 0.256 0.074 0.307
0.2 0.067 0.213 0.032 0.276 0.081 0.320
0.3* 0.070 0.209 0.037 0.279 0.086 0.327
0.4 0.072 0.206 0.043 0.278 0.092 0.331
0.5 0.075 0.203 0.048 0.274 0.097 0.333
0.6 0.077 0.201 0.054 0.270 0.103 0.335
0.7 0.078 0.200 0.06 0.266 0.108 0.335
0.8 0.080 0.198 0.065 0.262 0.113 0.334
0.9 0.082 0.197 0.071 0.257 0.118 0.333
1.0 0.084 0.196 0.075 0.253 0.122 0.332
2.7.2. What fraction of SG&A is an investment?
Arguably, the strongest assumptions in our intangible-capital measure are that λ = 30% of
SG&A represents an investment and λ is constant across firms and time. Table 18 shows
that our main conclusions go though, at least qualitatively, when we use different values of
λ ranging from zero to 100%. When λ is zero, firms’ intangible capital comes exclusively
from R&D. No matter what λ value we assume, we find larger q-slopes for physical invest-
ment, roughly equal R2 for physical and intangible investment, and the highest R2 for total
investment. Intangible investment has its largest R2 when λ = 30%, meaning the data seem
to prefer the λ value we use in our main analysis. The R2 is considerably lower (15% versus
28%) if λ = 0, so the data do prefer counting at least part of SG&A as investment.
Instead of assuming λ = 30%, we can let the data reveal λ’s value. The structural parameter
λ affects both the investment and q measures. We estimate λ along with the q-slope and
97
firm fixed effects by maximum likelihood, applied to the ιtot regression. The estimated λ
values are 0.38 in the consumer industry, 0.51 in the high-tech industry, and 0.24 in the
health care industry, which are all in the neighborhood of our assumed 0.3 value. However,
we do not push these λ estimates strongly, for three reasons. First, the investment-q relation
is not the ideal setting for identifying λ. Second, the estimation imposes two very strong
identifying assumptions: The linear investment-q model is true, and we measure all variables
perfectly. Finally, the λ estimate in the manufacturing industry is constrained at 1.0, which
is implausibly large and likely a symptom of the previous two issues. The main message
from this subsection, though, is that our main conclusions hold regardless of the λ value we
use.
2.7.3. Alternate measures of intangible capital
In addition to varying the SG&A multiplier λ, we try nine other variations on our intangible-
capital measure. We vary δSG&A, the depreciation rate for organization capital; we vary
δR&D, the depreciation rate for knowledge capital; we exclude Goodwill from firms’ intan-
gible capital; we exclude all balance sheet intangibles, which brings us closer to existing
measures from the literature; we set firms’ starting intangible capital stock to zero; and
we estimate firms’ starting intangible capital stock using a perpetuity formula, like Falato,
Kadyrzhanov, and Sim (2013). We also drop the first five years of data for each firm, which
makes the choice of starting intangible capital stock less important. We also try dropping
the 47% of firm-years with missing R&D from our regressions. Table 19 provides details
about these variations and their results. Although magnitudes vary somewhat, our main
results still hold in all these variations: Total q explains physical and intangible invest-
ment roughly equally well, total q explains total investment even better, and intangible
investment always has a lower q-slope.
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2.7.4. Alternate estimators
In addition to using the cumulant estimator to obtain unbiased q-slopes, we use the Biorn
(2000) and Arellano and Bond (1991) instrumental variable (IV) estimators. Both estima-
tors take first differences of the linear investment-q model and then use lagged regressors as
instruments for the q proxy. Erickson and Whited (2012) show that these IV estimators are
biased if measurement error is serially correlated, which is likely in our setting. This bias is
probably most severe in the standard regressions that omit intangible capital, as omitting
intangible capital is an important source of measurement error, and a firm’s intangible capi-
tal stock is highly serially correlated. Because the cumulant estimators are robust to serially
correlated measurement error, we prefer them over the IV estimators. The IV estimators
generate similar conclusions about adjustment costs. They produce lower q-slopes for ιint
than ιphy and lower q-slopes for ι∗ than ιphy (Online Appendix).
2.7.5. A mechanical result?
Is it mechanical that total q explains total investment better than standard q explains
standard investment? A potential concern is that moving from the latter regression to the
former requires multiplying both sides of the regression by Kphy/Ktot. Multiplying both
sides of a regression by the same variable can, but does not necessarily, increase the R2 even
if that variable is pure noise.
Our result is not mechanical or obvious, however. Multiplying both sides of the literature’s
standard regression by Kphy/Ktot produces the regression of ιphy on qtot, shown in Column
1 of Table 13. Contrary to the concern, that regression gets a slightly lower R2, τ2, and ρ2
value than the standard regression (last column in Table 13). Moving to the regression of
ιtot on qtot requires further multiplying ιphy, but not qtot, by the ratio of total to physical
investment. This change would further reduce the R2 if intangible investment were noise,
but instead R2 increases. Moreover, if our measure of intangible investment were just noise,
we would not find that it is well explained by q and co-moves with physical investment.
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The Online Appendix presents a placebo simulation analysis showing that our main results
would not obtain if our intangible capital measures were pure noise with similar statistical
properties.
2.8. Conclusion
The neoclassical theory of investment has been applied almost exclusively to physical capital.
We show that the theory is also relevant for intangible capital, which increasingly dominates
the US economy. In both our theory and firm-level data, physical and intangible investment
co-move strongly, and they are explained roughly equally well by Tobin’s q. Compared with
physical capital, intangible capital’s convex adjustment costs are roughly twice as large,
meaning intangible capital responds more slowly to changes in investment opportunities.
In macro data, Tobin’s q explains the level of intangible investment many times better
than physical investment. The neoclassical theory performs significantly better in firms,
industries, and years with more intangible capital.
Tobin’s q is “arguably the most common regressor in corporate finance” (Erickson and
Whited, 2012, p. 1286). Guided by our theory, we provide a new Tobin’s q measure that
accounts for intangible capital, and we show that it is a superior proxy for both physical
and intangible investment opportunities. This new Tobin’s q measure offers a simple way
to improve corporate finance regressions without additional econometrics. A benefit of the
new measure is that it can be easily computed for the full Compustat sample. Data on our
Tobin’s q measure and firms’ intangible capital can be downloaded from WRDS.
This paper revisits the basic facts about investment, Tobin’s q, and cash flow while account-
ing for intangible capital. We believe this is an important step, because a vast investment
literature in corporate finance and macroeconomics is built upon these facts. Important
next steps include understanding how physical and intangible capital interact, how they
face different prices for different firms in different periods, how they respond differently to
growth options and financial constraints, and how they show up differently in firms’ market
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values. Why the classic q-theory fits the data better in high-intangible settings is also an
interesting open question. Finally, there is more work to do on measuring intangible capital.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Prediction 1
Dropping firm subscripts, we can write the value function as
Vt = max
{Iphyt+s ,Iintt+s}
∫ ∞
0
Et{ Ktott+s[H (εt+s)−
γphy
2
(
Iphyt+s
Ktott+s
)2
− γ
int
2
(
Iintt+s
Ktott+s
)2
−
(
pphyt+s + ζ
phy
) Iphyt+s
Ktott+s
− (pintt+s + ζint) Iintt+sKtott+s ]}. (2.18)
Total capital follows
dKtott = K
tot
t
(
Iphyt
Ktott
+
Iintt
Ktott
− δ
)
dt. (2.19)
Following the same argument as in Appendix A of Abel and Eberly (1994), firm value must
be proportional to total capital Ktot :
V
(
Kphy,Kint, ε, pphy, pint
)
= Ktotqtot
(
ε, pphy, pint
)
. (2.20)
Differentiating this equation with respect to Kphy and Kint yields Eq. (2.5).
A.2. Proof of Prediction 2
Following a similar proof as in Abel and Eberly (1994), one can derive the Bellman equation
and take first-order conditions with respect to each investment rate to obtain
qtott =
∂
∂Imt
cm
(
Imt ,K
tot
t , p
m
t
)
= pmt + ζ
m + γm
Imt
Ktot
, m = phy, int. (2.21)
Rearranging yields Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7).
A.3. Proof of Prediction 4
Multiplying both sides of Eq. (2.6) by Ktotit /K
phy
it yields
ι∗it =
Iphyit
Kphyit
=
1
γphy
(
q∗it −
Ktotit
Kphyit
(
ζphyi + p
phy
it
))
. (2.22)
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Now consider a regression of ι∗it on q
∗
it and firm and time FEs. The residual in that regression,
ε∗it, equals the residual from a regression of − 1γphy
Ktotit
Kphyit
(
ζphyi + p
phy
it
)
on firm and time FEs.
This residual is nonzero and, hence, the regression’s R2 is less than 100%, because the ratio
Ktotit /K
phy
it cannot be fully explained by firm and time fixed effects. To see this last claim,
define ωit = K
tot
it /K
phy
it . By Ito’s lemma, ω evolves according to
dωit
ωit
=
[
ιphyit (1− ωit) + ιintit
]
dt. (2.23)
The evolution of ωit cannot be fully be explained by firm and time FEs, because it depends
on the investment rates ιphyit and ι
int
it , which depend on q
tot
it and, hence, εit, which cannot
be fully explained by the FEs. Furthermore, the error term ε∗it is negatively correlated to
the regressor q∗it = q
tot
it K
tot
it /K
phy
it , because K
tot
it /K
phy
it multiplies both terms, albeit with
a negative sign in ε∗it. Because the error term is negatively related to the regressor, the
regression produces downward-biased estimates of 1/γphy.
A.4. Proof of last prediction
Set dωit = 0 in Eq. (2.23) and solve for the equilibrium value, ω :
ω =
ιintit + ι
phy
it
ιphyit
=
1
γint
(
qtotit − ζ − pit
)
+ 1
γphy
(
qtotit − ζ − pit
)
1
γphy
(qtotit − ζ − pit)
=
γphy + γint
γint
. (2.24)
The last prediction follows, because Kint/Ktot = 1− 1/ω.
Appendix B. Measuring intangible capital
B.1. Measuring SG&A
We measure SG&A as Compustat variable xsga minus xrd minus rdip. We add the
following screen: When xrd exceeds xsga but is less than cogs, or when xsga is missing,
we measure SG&A as xsga with no further adjustments or zero if xsga is missing.
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The logic behind this formula is as follows. According to the Compustat manual, xsga
includes R&D expense unless the company allocates R&D expense to cost of goods sold
(COGS). For example, xsga often equals the sum of Selling, General and Administrative
and Research and Development on the Statement of Operations from firms’ 10-K filings. To
isolate (non-R&D) SG&A, we must subtract R&D from xsga when Compustat adds R&D
to xsga. There is a catch: When a firm externally purchases R&D on products not yet
being sold, this R&D is expensed as In-Process R&D and does not appear on the balance
sheet. Compustat adds to xsga only the part of R&D not representing acquired In-Process
R&D, so our formula subtracts rdip (In-Process R&D Expense), which Compustat codes as
negative. We find that Compustat almost always adds R&D to xsga, which motivates our
formula above. Standard & Poor’s explained in private communication that, “in most cases,
when there is a separately reported xrd, this is included in xsga.” As a further check, we
compare the Compustat records and 10-K filings for a random sample of one hundred firm-
year observations with non-missing xrd. We find that Compustat includes R&D in xsga
in 90 out of one hundred cases, partially includes it in xsga in one case, and includes it in
COGS in seven cases. Two cases remain unclear even after asking the Compustat support
team. The screen above lets us identify obvious cases in which xrd is part of COGS. This
screen catches six of the seven cases in which xrd is part of COGS. Unfortunately, identifying
the remaining cases is impossible without reading SEC filings. We thank the Compustat
support team from Standard & Poors for their help in this exercise.
We set xsga, xrd, and rdip to zero when missing. For R&D and SG&A, we make exceptions
in years when the firm’s assets are also missing. For these years, we interpolate these
two variables using their nearest non-missing values. We use these interpolated values to
compute capital stocks but not regressions’ dependent variables.
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B.2. Measuring firms’ initial capital stock
This section explains how we estimate the stock of knowledge and organization capital
in firm i’s first non-missing Compustat record. We describe the steps for estimating the
initial knowledge-capital stock. The method for organization capital is similar. Broadly, we
estimate firm i’s R&D spending in each year of life between the firm’s founding and its first
non-missing Compustat record, denoted year one. Our main assumption is that the firm’s
pre-IPO R&D grows at the average rate across pre-IPO Compustat records. We then apply
the perpetual inventory method to these estimated R&D values to obtain the initial stock
of knowledge capital at the end of year zero. The seven steps are as follows.
1. Define age since IPO as number of years elapsed since a firm’s IPO. Using the full
Compustat database, compute the average log change in R&D in each yearly cate-
gory of age since IPO. Apply these age-specific growth rates to fill in missing R&D
observations before 1977.
2. Using the full Compustat database, isolate records for firms’ IPO years and the pre-
vious two years. (Not all firms have pre-IPO data in Compustat.) Compute the
average log change in R&D within this pre-IPO subsample, which equals 0.348. (The
corresponding pre-IPO average log change in SG&A equals 0.333.)
3. If firm i’s IPO year is in Compustat, go to Step 5. Otherwise go to the next step.
4. This step applies almost exclusively to firms with IPOs before 1950. Estimate firm i’s
R&D spending in each year between the firm’s IPO year and first Compustat year,
assuming the firm’s R&D grows at the average age-specific rates estimated in Step 1.
5. Obtain data on firm i’s founding year from Jay Ritter’s website. For firms with missing
founding year, estimate the founding year as the minimum of (a) the year of the firm’s
first Compustat record and (b) firm’s IPO year minus eight, which is the median age
between founding and IPO for IPOs from 1980 to 2012 (from Jay Ritter’s website).
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6. Estimate the firm i’s R&D spending in each year between the firm’s founding year
and IPO year assuming the firm’s R&D grows at the estimated pre-IPO average rate
from Step 2.
7. Assume the firm is founded with no capital. Apply the perpetual inventory method
in Eq. (2.11) to the estimated R&D spending from the previous steps to obtain Gi0,
the stock of knowledge capital at the beginning of the firm’s first Compustat record.
We only use estimated R&D and SG&A values to compute firms’ initial stocks of intangible
capital. We never use estimated R&D in a regression’s dependent variable.
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